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Comments
ENDING THE TURF WARS: SUPPORT FOR A CFTC/SEC
CONSOLIDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, when Congress was considering sweeping amendments to
the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), I the White House contacted Ray
Garrett, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
offering to give the SEC regulatory jurisdiction over the commodity fu-.
tures industry.2 Chairman Garrett refused the offer, and Congress sub-
sequently created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
to do thejob.3 Since then, the two agencies have waged almost constant
war over the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions. 4 This conflict
has been fueled in particular by the advent of hybrid financial instru-
ments that have characteristics of both futures and securities 5 and new
trading strategies in which investors trade in the futures and securities
markets almost interchangeably. 6 Recently, the SEC has aggressively
advocated a merger of the agencies while the CFTC has been fighting
for its very existence. 7 This interagency feud has contributed to in-
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988). The amendments were known as the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 and were enacted as various
amendments to the existing sections of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id.
2. Schneider & Schapiro, What Corporate Lawyers Should Know About Commodity
Futures Law, in 21ST ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 71 (Practising Law Institute 1990).
3. Id.
4. See Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 1137, 1149-50 (7th Cir.) (tracing
disputes between agencies from 1975 to 1978), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026
(1982). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 93-99 and accompa-
nying text. For a further discussion of later disputes and proposed resolutions,
see infra notes 100-47 and accompanying text.
5. The best example of a financial instrument with characteristics of both a
security and a future is the index participation. For a further discussion of index
participations and the inability of the present jurisdictional system to regulate
such products, see infra notes 104-24 & 235-41 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of proposals to enable index participations to be traded, see
infra notes 128-47 and accompanying text.
6. See Schick, A Review and Analysis of the Changing Financial Environment, 44
Bus. LAw. 43 (1988) (advocating SEC jurisdiction over all securities-related fi-
nancial instruments).
7. See Financial Market Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
1st and 2d Sess. 369 (1987-1988) [hereinafter Financial Market Hearings] (discuss-
ing opposition to giving SEC authority over index futures); see also SEC, Treasury,
Greenspan Support Giving SEC Jurisdiction fbr Stock Index Futures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 459 (Mar. 30, 1990).
(1175)
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creased market volatility, 8 uncertainty in the hybrid instrument mar-
kets,9 the flight of investment funds overseas1 0 and a stifling of financial
innovation.I1 For these reasons, as well as others to be discussed, it is
submitted that Congress should end this incessant battling by consoli-
dating the SEC and the CFTC into a single regulatory agency with juris-
diction over all aspects of the futures and securities industries. 1 2
This Comment will begin by overviewing the futures and securities
industries and the roles that the CFTC and the SEC play in regulating
those industries.1 3 The next section will trace the history of disputes
between the agencies, with particular emphasis on the fight over Gov-
ernment National Mortgage Association (GNMA) options and stock in-
dex participations. 14 The third section will highlight current proposals
for resolving the jurisdictional disputes. 15 The final section will set
forth the factors mandating a consolidation of the agencies, as well as
the factors that will facilitate such a consolidation.' 6
II. THE CFTC AND THE FUTURES INDUSTRY
A. Futures Contracts
In general, a futures contract is an agreement between a seller (a
8. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS,
reprinted in [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,078
(Jan. 8, 1988) [hereinafter BRADY REPORT] (failure of market segments to act as
one contributed to 1987 market break). For a further discussion of the present
jurisdictional system's inability to effectively address the problem of market vol-
atility caused by intermarket trading, see infra notes 153-207 and accompanying
text.
9. Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 83. For a further discussion of the
uncertainty faced by the hybrid instrument industry, see infra notes 235-47 and
accompanying text.
10. Patrikis, New Product Issues, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMODITY Fu-
TURES REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 1989, at 469, 472 (1989) (Practising Law
Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook No. 667) (describing
flight of swaps market to Europe).
11. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that index participations could not be traded on securities ex-
changes), cert. denied, American Stock Exchange, Inc., v. Chicago Mercentile Ex-
change, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990). For a further discussion of how thejurisdictional conflicts have stifled financial innovation, see infra notes 235-47
and accompanying text.
12. For a full discussion of the factors mandating and facilitating a consoli-
dation of the agencies, see infra notes 148-302 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the futures industry and the CFTC, see infra notes
17-53 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the securities industry and the
SEC, see infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the disputes between the agencies, see infra notes
81-127 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of current proposals aimed at resolving the jurisdic-
tional disputes, see infra notes 128-47 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the factors mandating and facilitating a consolida-
tion of the agencies, see infra notes 148-302 and accompanying text.
1176 [Vol. 36: p. 1175
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"short") and a buyer (a "long") to deliver or take delivery of a specified
commodity, 17 at a specified price, on a specified date in the future.' 8
Although the contract imposes binding obligations on both parties when
formed, actual performance of these obligations is not required until the
date set for delivery, the expiration date of the contract.' 9 A futures
contract, therefore, has two primary characteristics: bilateral obligations
and futurity. 20 Delivery, however, is not an essential element of a fu-
tures contract despite the apparent requirement that a commodity be
delivered at some point in the future.2 ' Indeed, although the sale of the
underlying commodity appears to be the primary function of a futures
contract, over ninety-five percent of all futures contracts are extin-
17. Section 2 of the Commodities Exchange Act defines a commodity as
follows:
wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums,
mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool,
wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut
oil, soybean oil and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cotton-
seed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products,
and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles,
except onions as provided in section 13-1 of this title, and all services,
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently
or in the future dealt in ....
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Thus, anything, except onions, can become a commodity
simply by having a futures contract based on it.
Futures contracts were developed in the eighteenth century to counteract
the unavoidable price fluctuations caused by seasonal changes in commodity
supplies. STAFF OF GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES AND FUTURES,
How THE MARKETS DEVELOPED AND How THEY ARE REGULATED 65-66 (1986)
[hereinafter GAO STAFF STUDY]. While most early futures contracts resulted in
actual delivery of the underlying commodity, futures traders soon learned that
extinguishing their positions through offset was more profitable than requiring
delivery. Id. at 66 (citing THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, THE COMMODITY FUTURES COMMISSION & SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF TRADING IN FUTURES
AND OPrIONS, ch. 3, at 5-6 (1984)).
18. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.03 (2d ed.
1989). A futures contract differs from forward contracts and spot transactions,
two other commodities transactions that are exempt from CFTC regulation
under § 2 of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id.; see also 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). A
forward contract is a present sale of a commodity with a provision for future
delivery. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra, § 1.03. A spot transaction is a present
sale of a commodity with a provision for immediate delivery. Id. § 1.09. Since
the vast majority of farmers sell their crops through forward contracts, futures
have only a secondary impact on the agricultural economy. GAO STAFF STUDY,
supra note 17, at 64.
19. See 1 P. JOHNSON AND T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.03.
20. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 541 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, American Stock Exchange, Inc., v. Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990). Futurity means that the value of the contract is
set in the future. Id.
21. Id. at 542. In fact, many futures contracts, particularly those based on
financial commodities such as stock indices and interest rates, are entirely in-
compatible with a delivery requirement. Id.
1991] 1177
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guished before delivery22 through the taking of offsetting positions in
different, but identical contracts. 2 3
Two fundamentally different groups trade in futures contracts. The
first group, known as hedgers, uses futures contracts to protect them-
selves against price swings in the underlying commodity.2 4 Normally, a
hedger will acquire a position in the futures market that is directly oppo-
site to the position the hedger has in a commercial transaction. 25 A
hedger, therefore, normally does not trade in futures contracts for their
profit potential. The second group of traders, known as speculators, ba-
sically bets that the value of the contract will increase or decrease before
the expiration date.26 The speculator has no real interest in the under-
lying commodity; the focus is on the price of the contract and its profit
potential.2 7 Although many commodity producers believe that specula-
tors cause volatile commodities prices, studies indicate that speculation
is beneficial to the "liquidity, efficiency, and competitiveness of the [fu-
tures] markets."' 28 Such speculation also enables futures transactions to
perform their two basic functions: discovery of future commodities
prices and hedging. 2
9
B. Futures Exchanges
The Commodities Exchange Act provides that all futures transac-
tions must occur on a registered futures exchange. 30 At present, futures
are traded on thirteen exchanges, with the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change (CME) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) being the larg-
est and most prominent exchanges. 3' Several of the futures exchanges
22. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 63. Hedgers are most likely to take
delivery of the underlying commodity; speculators almost always offset their
contracts. Id. For further discussion of the roles of hedgers and speculators, see
infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
23. Chicago Mercantile, 883 F.2d at 542. A futures contract can be extin-
guished either through offset, which is the taking of an opposite position in a
different but identical contract, or by cash settlement. Id. If the parties decide
to settle in cash, settlement is based on changes in the value of the contract. Id.
24. 1 P. JOHNSON& T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.12.
25. Id.
26. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 63.
27. Id.
28. Id. Futures trading has often been criticized by farmers who believe
that speculation causes "spectacular price fluctuations and manipulation" in the
underlying commodities markets. Id. at 67. For this reason, many states consid-
ered outlawing futures trading before the federal government began regulating
it. Id.
29. See Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 1137, 1151 (7th Cir.)
("[T]rading serves legitimate hedging and price discovery functions, thereby fa-
cilitating production of the underlying commodity."), vacated as moot, 459 U.S.
1026 (1982).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii), (v) (1988).
31. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 11. Futures are presently traded
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, Mid-America
1178 [Vol. 36: p. 1175
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are subsidiaries of registered securities exchanges, thereby ensuring that
certain exchange officials will have contact with both the SEC and the
CFTC.3 2
The exchange itself is physically structured so that each futures con-
tract has its own trading area known as a pit.3 3 In the pits, trading oc-
curs using the open outcry method, in which traders verbally establish
contract prices in competitive bidding.3 4 Although a futures contract is
originally formed by a buyer and a seller, the exchange's clearinghouse
is the party that ultimately takes the position opposed to both the buyer
and the seller. 3 5 It is this interposition that allows a futures participant
to offset his obligations by taking an opposing position in a different, but
identical contract. 36
C. Commodities Exchange Act
By 1974, the federal government had over fifty years of experience
regulating the futures industry.3 7 Rising food prices and grain
shortages, coupled with manipulative activities in the futures markets,
led Congress to enact sweeping amendments patterned after the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 193438 to the CEA. 39 The major provision of the
1974 amendments was the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, an independent federal agency patterned after the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, with jurisdictional authority over the
Commodity Exchange, Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange, New York Cotton
Exchange, New York Futures Exchange, Commodity Exchange, Inc., Coffee,
Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, New York Mercantile Exchange, Amex Commodi-
ties Corporation, Kansas City Board of Trade, Philadelphia Board of Trade and
Minneapolis Grain Exchange. Id. at 9. Seventy-five percent of all futures are
traded on the CBOT and the CME. Id. at 11.
32, Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 499 (testimony ofJohn Phelan,
President of the New York Stock Exchange); see also PHILADELPHIA STOCK Ex-
CHANGE, SEEING WITH THE EYE OF IMAGINATION 8 (1988).
33. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 70.
34. Id. CFTC Rule 1.38 requires competitive bidding in all futures transac-
tions unless the Commission approves the non-competitive execution of the
transaction. 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1991).
35. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.04. Once the original
trade is completed, the traders owe their obligations to the clearinghouse, not to
the party with whom they traded. See also Chicago Mercantile Exchange v.
S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1989) (futures contracts settled by offsetting
obligations which are cancelled by clearing house), cert. denied, American Stock
Exchange, Inc., v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990).
36. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.04.
37. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982) (noting federal government regulation of commodities futures since
1921).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
39. Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F. Supp.
1105, 1108 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (rejecting state and federal securities law claims of
stock index futures investor); see also Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 78
(CFTC patterned after SEC).
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entire commodity futures industry. 40 The CFTC's jurisdiction was even
broader than anticipated because the amendments enlarged the defini-
tion of a commodity beyond traditional agricultural products4 ' and in-
cluded a clause giving the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over any product
having the elements of a futures contract. 4 2 The exclusivity clause, as it
is known, has led to much of the conflict between the SEC and the
CFTC.43
D. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
The CFTC was created in 1974 for the purpose of"protect[ing] the
public from fraud and manipulation in the [futures] marketplace."'44
The CFTC has jurisdiction over all futures contract transactions but
does not have regulatory authority over the underlying commodities.4 5
Thus, while the CFTC was created in response to agricultural crises, its
regulatory impact on the agricultural economy is tangential at best.4 6
The CFTC exercises its regulatory authority principally by overseeing
the efforts of self-regulatory organizations such as the futures exchanges
40. Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 78. The CFTC was created pur-
suant to § 4a(a)(l) of the Commodities Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a)(1)
(1988).
41. The expanded definition of a commodity includes "all other goods and
articles . . .and all services, rights and interests in which contracts for future
delivery are presently or in the future dealt." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). For the full
definition of a commodity, see supra note 17. Commenting on the expanded
definition of commodity, the Mallen court stated that the "act ... perhaps too
broadly, expanded the concept of a commodity from the edible to the intangi-
ble." Mallen, 605 F. Supp. at 1108.
42. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The exclusivity clause reads:
Provided, That the Commission [CFTC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction,
except to the extent otherwise provided ... with respect to ... transac-
tions involving contracts of a commodity for future delivery, traded or
executed on a contract market . . . And provided further, That, except as
hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (i) super-
sede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities
and Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the
laws of the United States or of any State, or (ii) restrict the Securities
and Exchange Commission and such other authorities from carrying
out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws.
Id.
43. See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.
1989) (index participations within exclusive jurisdiction of CFTC), cert. denied,
110 U.S. 3214 (1990).
44. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 9.
45. See Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 355. CFTC Chairperson
Wendy Gramm testified that "[w]e regulate futures in general . . .[w]e do not
regulate the oil markets, we do not regulate the wheat and corn, we regulate the
futures markets." Id.
46. See GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 64. Most farmers sell their
crops by use of forward contracts that are exempt from the CFTC's jurisdiction.
See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
1180 [Vol. 36: p. 1175
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and the National Futures Association,4 7 an organization patterned after
the National Association of Securities Dealers. 48 This system of regula-
tion was patterned after that of the SEC and the securities industry.4 9
The CFTC consists of five commissioners, one of whom is the chair-
man, appointed for five year terms by the President, subject to Senate
confirmation.5 0 The CFTC is organized into three major divisions:
Trading and Markets (responsible for market regulation), Enforcement
(responsible for investigation of alleged violations of the provisions of
the CEA and CFTC rules) and Economic Analysis (responsible for re-
view of trading activities). 5 ' Although the CFTC as a whole was pat-
terned after the SEC, the Division of Economic Analysis performs a
function unique to the CFTC in that it analyzes all proposed futures
contracts to ensure that each contract has a valid economic purpose.52
The SEC, on the other hand, takes the view that it is not the guarantor
of a security's economic viability.5 3
III. THE SEC AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
A. Securities
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines a security as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in
any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, op-
tion, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
47. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 70, 76.
48. 1 P. JOHNSON AND T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.89; see also GAO STAFF
STUDY, supra note 17, at 68.
49. Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 78. The major divisions of the
CFTC, with the exception of the Division of Economic Analysis, are the func-
tional equivalents of the major SEC divisions. Id. For a further discussion of the
organizational structure of the CFTC, see infra notes 50-51 and accompanying
text. For a further discussion of the SEC, see infra notes 74-78 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the major difference between the agencies, see infra
notes 52-53 & 79-80 and accompanying text.
50. 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a)(1) (1988); see also 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note
18, § 1.80. The House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry oversee the CFTC.
51. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.80. The CFTC has ap-
proximately 500 staff members working in its Washington headquarters and four
regional offices. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 9.
52. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.80; see also 7 U.S.C. § 4
(1988).
53. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE SEC 4
(1986) [hereinafter WORK OF THE SEC] (role of securities regulation is full dis-
closure which enables investors to make their own decisions as to value).
1991] COMMENT 1181
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group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange re-
lating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument com-
monly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing. .... 54
Securities have two principal purposes. First, securities are one of the
primary means of raising business capital. 55 Second, securities are a ve-
hicle by which investors can earn profits from another's efforts. 56
B. Securities Markets
Securities markets have two major functions. First, securities mar-
kets serve as a forum for the formation of business capital through the
sale of a corporation's securities. 57 Second, securities markets provide a
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). The definition of security mentions cer-
tain forms of securities by name, such as "stock," "bond" and "debenture." Id.
In addition, the definition provides several generic categories, such as "invest-
ment contract," "certificates of interest or participation" and "any instrument
commonly known as a 'security,'" which may be used to bring novel financial
instruments within the scope of the federal securities laws. Id. For example, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange argued that its GNMA options were securities
under the "warrant or rights to subscribe to or purchase" clause, the "invest-
ment contract" clause or the "commonly known as a security" clause of the stat-
utory definition. Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 1137, 1156-58 (7th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). For a further discussion of Board of Trade,
see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
55. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 543 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 U.S. 3214 (1990). In contrast, the fundamental purposes
of futures transactions are price discovery and hedging. Id. For a discussion of
the similarity between securities and futures transactions, see infra notes 250-74
and accompanying text.
56. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). In Howey, the
security involved was a combination land sale and service contract which entitled
the purchaser to a portion of a Florida orange grove plus the company's profes-
sional services in cultivating, harvesting and marketing the resulting crop. Id. at
295. The Supreme Court held that the contracts constituted an investment con-
tract because the purchasers "invest[ed] [their] money in a common enterprise
and [were] led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party." Id. at 298-300.
57. Chicago Mercantile, 883 F.2d at 543. New issues of securities, however,'
particularly those of new ventures, rarely trade on the New York Stock Exchange
or similar exchanges. R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 417
(1989). Most initial offerings of new ventures are conducted by brokerage
houses contacting established customers. Id.; see also, Financial Market Hearings,
supra note 7, at 436 (testimony of Leo Melamed, Chairman of Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange). Chairman Melamed argued that the New York Stock Exchange
does not directly support capital formation because few new issues are traded on
the exchange. He testified, however, that stock index futures indirectly en-
courage capital formation by "transferring the risk of a stock portfolio, and by
1182
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ready forum for the resale of securities by investors. 58 The ability to
resell in a liquid market is one of the most important reasons investors
participate in the securities markets, thereby aiding the formation of
capital. 5 9 Securities such as options, which are issued by persons rather
than corporations, also improve liquidity and aid capital formation.
60
Securities are presently sold on nine exchanges, 6 ' with the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) being the largest and most prominent. 62 In contrast to futures,
which must be sold on a registered futures exchange, securities may be
sold away from an exchange, either on the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers Automatic Quotation System (NASDAQ) or through a
broker-oriented network known as the over-the-counter market. 63 In
fact, NASDAQ is the second largest securities market in the United
States and the third largest in the world. 64 Securities may also be sold in
a variety of transactions that are exempt from federal regulation, such as
providing liquidity for 'baskets' of stock. " Financial Market Hearings, supra note
7, at 437.
58. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 22. Providing a forum for investor
resale is perhaps the most significant feature of the larger exchanges such as the
New York Stock Exchange. R. HAMILTON, supra note 57, at 417; see also Financial
Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 436-37 (testimony of Leo Melamed, Chairman of
Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (real role of New York Stock Exchange is to pro-
vide liquidity to shareholders).
59. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 22.
60. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, COMMODITY
FUTURES COMM'N & SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, A STUDY ON THE EF-
FECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS 1-2 (1985)
(presented to the House Committee on Agriculture, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.). The
futures industry claims that stock index futures also improve liquidity in the se-
curities markets and indirectly aid capital formation. Financial Market Hearings,
supra note 7, at 437 (testimony of Leo Melamed, Chairman of Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange).
61. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 8. Securities are presently sold on
the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange, Boston Stock Exchange, Midwest Stock Exchange, Pacific Stock
Exchange, Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange and Spo-
kane Stock Exchange. Id. at 8 n. 1.
62. Id. at 11. Ninety percent of all securities transactions occur on the New
York and American Stock Exchanges or over the NASDAQ quotation system.
Id.
63. Id. at 8.
64. The Market Reform Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities
and the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on S. 648, 10 1st Cong.,
1st Sess. 61 (1989) [hereinafter Market Reform Hearings] (testimony of Joseph
Hardiman, President of the National Association of Securities Dealers). The
House compromise version of the Market Reform Act was signed into law on
October 16, 1990. President Signs Major New Laws on Enforcement Remedies, Market
Reform, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1475 (Oct. 19, 1990). The Act
gives the SEC the authority to close securities markets during emergencies, re-
strain program trading during periods of market volatility and collect informa-
tion on large traders. Id.
1991] COMMENT 1183
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private placements and intrastate offerings. 6 5
The form of securities trading varies depending on the location of
the trade. On the securities exchanges, like the futures exchanges, trad-
ing occurs in specially-designated areas by competitive, auction-like bid-
ding between traders. 6 6 Specialists, brokers who specialize in the
trading of a certain security, step into the fray whenever necessary to
ensure a fair and orderly market. 67 In the off-exchange markets, how-
ever, brokers contact market makers, other brokers who guarantee that
they will trade in a specified security, and negotiate the best deal possi-
ble for their customers. 68
C. Securities and Exchange Commission
Federal regulation of the securities industry was prompted by the
stock market crash of 1929.69 In 1933, Congress passed the Securities
Act, which required the registration of most securities and the disclosure
of detailed information concerning the entities issuing the securities.
70
One year later, in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress cre-
ated the SEC, an independent, quasi-judicial regulatory agency.7 1 Con-
gress charged the SEC with the responsibility of "protect[ing] the public
from fraud and abuses in the securities markets." 72 The SEC exercises
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(2), 77c(a)(1 1) (1988). A private placement is an offer-
ing of a security which does not involve a public offering. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)
(1988). In Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC has provided
three "safe-harbor" rules, Rules 504 to 506, for issuers desiring to conduct pri-
vate offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.508 (1991). Rules 505 and 506 both pro-
hibit the sale of the exempt security to more than 35 nonaccredited investors.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 506(b)(2)(i).
An intrastate offering is an offering in which all offerees are residents of the
state in which the issuer is resident and doing business. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(1 1) (1988). Rule 147 serves as a safe-harbor for issuers conducting an
intrastate offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1991).
66. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 23. For a discussion of futures
exchanges and the form of futures transactions, see supra notes 30-36 and ac-
companying text.
67. R. HAMILTON, supra note 57, at 424. The role of a specialist is to "let
the market find its proper level, given the supply and demand for the stock that
then exists" but not to "try to prevent market declines." Id. Nevertheless, many
commentators have focused on the specialist system as one of the major contrib-
utors to the 1987 market break. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, DIVISION
OF MARKET REGULATION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 4-1 to 4-72 (1988)
[hereinafter SEC CRASH REPORT], reprinted in [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,118 (Feb. 1988).
68. R. HAMILTON, supra note 57, at 436.
69. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 27.
70. WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 53, at 5-8.
71. Id. at 3. The SEC was created pursuant to § 4 of the Securities Ex-
change Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1988). The Federal Trade Commission admin-
istered the Securities Act of 1933 before the SEC was created. R.JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 479 (6th ed. 1987).
72. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 9.
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its regulatory authority principally by overseeing the efforts of self-regu-
latory organizations such as the securities exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers. 7 3
The SEC consists of five commissioners appointed for five year
terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.74 The
SEC is organized into four primary divisions: Corporation Finance (re-
sponsible for the adequacy of disclosure materials); Market Regulation
(responsible for overseeing the participants and the activity in the secon-
dary markets); Investment Management (responsible for administering
the Investment Company Act, 75 the Investment Advisers Act 76 and the
Public Utility Holding Company Act 77 ) and Enforcement (responsible
for enforcing the federal securities laws). 78 Unlike the CFTC, the SEC
does not analyze securities offerings for economic viability. 79 The
premise behind federal securities regulation is that, with adequate infor-
mation, an investor can make individual judgments concerning a secur-
ity's value.8
0
IV. HISTORY OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
A. Introduction
The history of disputes between the SEC and the CFTC dates back
to the very dawn of the CFTC's existence. The CFTC officially com-
menced operations on April 30, 1975.81 On February 14, 1975, the
SEC, fearful that the Commodity Exchange Act's exclusivity clause
would preempt SEC jurisdiction over stock options, proposed an
73. Id. at 37. This regulatory scheme was proposed by the Roper Commis-
sion, a presidential commission charged with investigating the 1929 crash. Id. at
27.
74. WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 53, at 3.
75. 15 U.S.C §§ 80a-I to -2 (1988). The Investment Company Act regu-
lates mutual funds and other forms of investment companies in which investors
pool their assets under the professional management of the fund. T. HAZEN,
THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION 566-67 (1985).
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -2 (1988). The Investment Advisers Act regu-
lates professionals who render investment advice but do not fall within the bro-
ker-dealer regulations under the Securities Exchange Act. T. HAZEN, supra note
75, at 626 n.2.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1988). "The Public Utility Holding Company
Act regulates holding companies with subsidiaries which are public utilities." T.
HAZEN, supra note 75, at 534.
78. WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 53, at 24-36. The commissioners are sup-
ported by a staff of over 2,000 persons located in the SEC's Washington, D.C.
headquarters, regional offices located in New York, Boston, Atlanta, Chicago,
Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, Seattle and Philadelphia and branch offices in
Miami, Detroit, Houston, Salt Lake City and San Francisco. Id. at 38-40; see also
GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 9.
79. For a further discussion of the CFTC's economic analysis, see supra
notes 45-46.
80. WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 53, at 4.
81. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.80.
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amendment to the Securities Exchange Act which would give the SEC
exclusive jurisdiction over all "transactions involving a 'security.' ",82
Thus, the battle over jurisdiction began even before the CFTC officially
commenced operations. The battle did not escalate, however, until
1981, when the SEC approved the application of the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange to trade options on GNMA mortgage certificates. 83
B. The Fight for "Ginnie Mae"
1. Products Based on GNMA Certificates
The Government National Mortgage Association established the
GNMA certificate program to secure new funds for government-backed
mortgage programs. 84 The holder of a GNMA certificate, a "Ginnie
Mae," was entitled to receive a portion of the income generated by the
mortgage program. 85 GNMA certificates paid a fixed rate of interest, so
the value of the investment depended on the level of outside interest
rates. 86 Accordingly, derivative products, GNMA options and futures,
were created to transfer the risk of adverse interest rate fluctuations
from the certificate holders to speculators. 8 7
The Chicago Board of Trade began trading in GNMA futures, con-
tracts for the future delivery of GNMA certificates at a fixed price, in
1975.88 Like most futures, the GNMA futures were ordinarily extin-
guished through offset or cash settlement, not delivery. 8 9 In 1981, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) began trading in GNMA op-
tions.90 The options entitled the holder to buy or sell GNMA certifi-
cates at a set price before a certain date.9 ' The CBOT brought suit in
1981 challenging the SEC approval of a rule that would have permitted
the CBOE to trade GNMA options on the grounds that the CFTC had
82. Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1149 (7th Cir.) (quoting Hear-
ings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs on S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1975)), vacated as moot, 459
U.S. 1026 (1982).
83. Id. at 1138.
84. Id. at 1138-39.
85. Id. at 1139.
86. Id. An investor would recognize a profit from a GNMA investment if
outside interest rates remained below those paid on the GNMA certificates. Id.
87. Id. For a discussion of the general role of futures in transactions such
as this one, see supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
88. Board of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1152-53.
89. Id. For a discussion of the practice of offset and cash settlement in fu-
tures transactions, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
90. Board of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1139.
91. Id. GNMA options differed from GNMA futures in that the owner of a
GNMA option had the right, but not the obligation, to purchase or sell the
GNMA certificate on or before the expiration date, while the owner of a GNMA
future was obligated to purchase or sell the GNMA certificate or extinguish his
position through offset or cash settlement on or before the expiration date. Id.
1186 [Vol. 36: p. 1175
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exclusive jurisdiction over the options. 92
2. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Securities and Exchange
Commission
In Board of Trade of Chicago v. Securities and Exchange Commission,9 3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
CBOT, holding that the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction over GNMA
options and imposing a ban on GNMA options trading.94 The Board of
Trade court first held that GNMA options were, in essence, futures con-
tracts because the options had the characteristics of a "legitimate com-
modity derivative."'9 5 The court then rejected the assertions of the SEC
and CBOE that GNMA options were securities under the "warrants or
rights to subscribe to or purchase" securities clause, 96 the "investment
contract" clause 9 7 or the "commonly known as securities" clause of sec-
tion 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act.98 Thus, the court in-
structed that even though "the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction clause must
have some limits," options on GNMA certificates fell within those
limits .99
3. Jurisdictional Accord
In 1982, in response to the ever-widening rift between their agen-
cies, Phillip Johnson, Chairman of the CFTC, and John Shad, Chairman
of the SEC, negotiated a deal that purported to settle the jurisdictional
dispute.' 0 0 Under the terms of the agreement, known as the John-
92. Id. at 1140-41.
93. 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
94. Id. at 1153, 1161 n.49 ("[W]hile we wait for the CFTC to follow proce-
dures set out in CEA § 4c(c), GNMA options are to be banned.").
95. Id. at 1152-53. In making its determination, the court relied on the fact
that the GNMA option was based on a commodity and served "legitimate hedg-
ing and price discovery functions, thereby facilitating production of the underly-
ing commodity." Id. at 1151. The court subsequently opined, however, that the
GNMA certificate was a security. Id. at 1155. The court then qualified this state-
ment by stating that "we shall assume without deciding that GNMA's are securi-
ties." Id. at 1156 n.36.
96. Id. at 1156-57. The court distinguished traditional options to buy stock
from GNMA options, holding that GNMA options were not options to buy se-
curities. Id. at 1156-57 & 1156 n.37.
97. Id. at 1157-58. The GNMA options could not be an investment con-
tract because of the court's earlier finding that they were futures. Id. According
to the court, commodity futures are not investment contract securities. Id. at
1158.
98. Id. The court, citing United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 852 (1975), stated that the analysis was the same for an "instrument
commonly known as a 'security'" and an "investment contract." Board of Trade,
677 F.2d at 1158. For the text of § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, see supra text accompanying note 54.
99. See Board of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1147-48.
100. Schick, supra note 6, at 61.
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son/Shad or Shad/Johnson Accord depending on the speaker's alle-
giance, the CFTC was to have exclusive jurisdiction over all futures
contracts, options on futures, stock index futures and options on stock
index futures, while the SEC was to have authority over options on se-
curities and options on stock indices.' 0 ' The agreement was subse-
quently codified as amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act and
the Securities Exchange Act.10 2 Although the accord has settled juris-
dictional issues as to the stated instruments, it is incapable of addressing
new instruments such as stock index participations.10 3
C. The Battle Over Index Participations
1. Index Participations
In the late 1980s, securities exchanges developed index participa-
tions (IPs) as a means for investors to "buy the market" without endur-
ing the time and expense of buying a broad range of stocks. 10 4 The
development of IPs was hastened by studies recommending the trading
of baskets of stock as a means of preventing future stock market
crashes. ' 0
5
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, one of three exchanges offering
IPs,10 6 developed two IPs, called Cash Index Participations or CIPs.
The Standard & Poor's (S&P's) 500 CIP was based on the S&P's 500
Index and represented one-tenth of the index's value.' 0 7 The Blue Chip
CIP was based on a price-weighted index of twenty-five blue chip stocks
and represented one-hundredth of the underlying index's value. 10 8
101. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION & COMMODITIES FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION, JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21, 332 (Feb. 2, 1982) (setting forth terms
of Johnson/Shad Accord).
102. Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982); Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat.
2294 (1983) (both codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.
(1988)).
103. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990). The Chicago Mercantile court stated
that "newfangled instruments may have aspects of each of the prototypes. Our
case is about such an instrument, the index participation (IP). We must decide
whether tetrahedrons belong in square or round holes." Id.
104. PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE, THE POWER OF SIMPLICITY CASH IN-
DEX PARTICIPATIONS FROM THE PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE 4-5 (1988) [here-
inafter POWER OF SIMPLICITY].
105. Id.
106. Chicago Mercantile, 883 F.2d at 540. The American Stock Exchange of-
fered an IP called the Equity Index Participation (EIP), while the Chicago Board
Options Exchange offered an IP called the Value of Index Participation (VIP).
Id. The EIP differed from the CIP in that holders of 500 EIP units could receive
shares of stock when cashing-out their positions. Id. The VIP differed from the
other products in that it had a semi-annual cash-out and the short could cash-out
by tendering the value of the underlying index on the cash-out date. Id.
107. POWER OF SIMPLICITY, supra note 104, at 6.
108. Id. at 7.
1188 [Vol. 36: p. 1175
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Trading occurred in round lots of 100 CIP units. 10 9 The CIP's value
would increase or decrease in correlation with the underlying index's
value. In addition, the CIP paid all dividends declared on the stock in
the underlying index. "10
CIPs were designed to be permanent instruments with no expira-
tion date.' The CIP owner could, however, "cash-out," sell his posi-
tion on a specified quarterly date or on any other day, incurring only a
small penalty. 1 12 The owner could also cash-out through offset, taking
the opposite position in a different, but identical contract. 113 These fea-
tures were intended to give small investors "a permanent stake in the
market without being subject to the time constraints that exist in index
futures and options products." ' 1 4 For this reason, CIPs were generally
hailed as desirable, worthwhile products. 15
2. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Securities and Exchange
Commission
In 1989, the CME and CBOT brought suit in federal court challeng-
ing the SEC's approval of IP trading on the Philadelphia and American
109. Id. at 9. For example, if the S&P Index was valued at 250, the price of
a single CIP unit would be $25, and a single round lot purchase would cost
$2500. Id. at 6-7.
110. Id. at 3. By paying the dividends that the underlying stocks were pay-
ing, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange was clearly attempting to infuse character-
istics of a security into the CIP, and therefore differentiate it from an index
future and preserve the SEC's jurisdiction over the product. Id.
111. Id. The lack of an expiration date is a clear attempt to differentiate the
CIP from an index future. Id.
112. Id. at 10. The penalty equaled one-half of one percent of the CIP's
value. Id. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange argued that the CIP was not a fu-
tures contract because the daily cash-out provision eliminated the element of
futurity. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 550 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990).
113. POWER OF SIMPLIcrrv, supra note 104, at 10. Unfortunately for the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the offset potential gave the CIP one of the char-
acteristics of a future. Chicago Mercantile, 883 F.2d at 546.
114. POWER oF SIMPLIcrrY, supra note 104, at 5.
115. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 132 (statement of Senator
John Heinz). Senator Heinz stated that
when you have got a product that has, if you will, gotten a repeated
Good Housekeeping seal of approval and that the goal of the product,
as established by study after study, is to make the markets less volatile,
enhance investor confidence, bring those small investors back into the
market who as of 1988 constituted all of 18.5 percent of the trading
volume, it seems to me there ought to be a way of getting that product
into the marketplace that doesn't rely on an interminable-and I do
mean interminable-series of court proceedings, appeals, reappeals
that has the net effect, whether you mean or not, to keep that product
out.
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Stock Exchanges and the Chicago Board Options Exchange.'" 6 In the
course of the authorization hearings before the SEC, the CFTC and the
futures exchanges argued that IPs were futures within the CFTC's juris-
diction and urged the SEC not to approve IPs for trading on the securi-
ties exchanges. 1 7 The SEC, however, found that IPs were securities
and approved their trading." 18
In Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Securities and Exchange Commission," 9
the Seventh Circuit sided, as in Board of Trade, with the CFTC and the
futures exchanges, holding that IPs fell within the CEA's exclusivity
clause and could not, therefore, be traded on the securities ex-
changes.' 2 0 The Chicago Mercantile court noted that while "the SEC
found IPs to be securities by looking at the promises made to the longs
[dividends, daily cash-outs and no expiration], the CFTC found them to
be futures by virtue of the promises made by the shorts [quarterly cash-
outs and value dependent on future events]." 2 ' The court further
stated that an IP is "no less a future than it is a security, and no more. It
just doesn't fit. Which is the whole point. It isn't supposed to be like
something else; the IP was designed as a novel instrument so that it
could offer attributes previously missing in the market."' 22 The court
concluded, however, that because the IP had some elements of a future,
it fell within the CFTC's jurisdiction under the exclusivity clause and
could not be traded on securities exchanges. 123 The court observed
that in the case of innovative derivative products, "[o]nly merger of the
agencies or functional separation in the statute can avoid continual
conflict."1 24
D. Escalation
The jurisdictional dispute between the SEC and the CFTC reached
new levels of intensity after the stock market break in 1987, but it was
not until the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Mercantile that the
116. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990).
117. Id. at 539.
118. Id. at 540. The SEC concluded that IPs were securities as either
"stock," because "they pay dividends, may appreciate in value and may be hy-
pothecated," or "certificates of interest or participation in" stock. Id. For the
complete text of the definition of security under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, see text accompanying note 54. The SEC also concluded that IPs were
not futures contracts because IPs lacked the elements of futurity and bilateral-
ism. Chicago Mercantile, 883 F.2d at 541.
119. 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990).
120. Id. at 550 ("[Tlhe SEC's order approving the applications of the stock
exchanges and the OCC [to trade IPs] are set aside.").
121. Id. at 545-46 (emphasis omitted).
122. Id. at 546.
123. Id. at 548-50.
124. Id. at 544.
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agencies engaged in open hostility. 125 Recently, the SEC has aggres-
sively advocated a merger of the agencies while the CFTC has fought for
its very existence.' 2 6 The ever-escalating conflict has drawn the atten-
tion of several prominent congressmen and administration officials, one
of whom described the conduct of the agencies' chairmen as "juve-
nile."' 127 The following section contains a discussion of several recent
proposals for ending the jurisdictional disputes.
V. RECENT PROPOSALS
A. Introduction
The recent proposals for ending the jurisdictional conflict between
the SEC and the CFTC generally can be placed into three camps: those
calling for the retention of the present jurisdictional scheme, 128 those
advocating SEC jurisdiction over any product based on a securities in-
dex 129 and those demanding a total merger or consolidation of the
agencies.13 0 Within the federal government, the CFTC opposes both a
merger and a jurisdictional shift, while the SEC and the Treasury De-
partment advocate a merger of the agencies.13' The Federal Reserve
Board opposes a merger and has no official opinion on the subject of a
jurisdictional realignment; but, Chairman Alan Greenspan supports a
jurisdictional realignment while opposing a total merger, a position ap-
parently supported by President Bush.' 3 2
125. See, e.g., Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 353-55 (committee
questions concerning jurisdiction directed at chairmen of SEC and CFTC).
126. See, e.g., SEC, Treasury, Greenspan Support Giving SECJurisdiction for Stock
Index Futures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 459 (Mar. 30, 1990); Shift
of Index Products to SEC Would Weaken CFTC, Gramm Contends, 22 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 481 (Mar. 30, 1990) (CFTC opposition to jurisdictional
realignment).
127. Brady Rules Out Any Compromise on SEC-CFTCJurisdiction Dispute, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1031 (July 13, 1990) (statement of Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady).
128. For a discussion of the proposal to retain the present jurisdictional
system, see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of the proposal to realign the jurisdiction of the agen-
cies, see infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of the proposal to merge the agencies, see infra notes
146-47 and accompanying text. For support of a proposal to consolidate the
agencies, see infra notes 148-302 and accompanying text.
131. SEC, Treasury, Greenspan Support Giving SEC Jurisdiction for Stock Index Fu-
tures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 459 (Mar. 30, 1990).
132. Id. Support for the CFTC's position has not been unanimous, how-
ever. Present Commissioner William Albrecht has stated that the Jurisdictional
Accord needs to be updated to "permit[] and encourage[] competition within
the futures industry, within the securities industry and between the two indus-
tries." CFTC's Albrecht says SEC-CFTC Jurisdictional Accord Needs Change, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 141-42 (Jan. 26, 1990). Furthermore, former
CFTC Commissioner James Stone has advocated a merger of the agencies since
1982. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
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B. Retention of Present Jurisdictional Structure
Basically, the only parties advocating a retention of the present ju-
risdictional structure are the CFTC, the Senators and Representatives
on the agriculture committees, and the futures industry itself.'3 3 The
basic argument against any change is that the present jurisdictional
structure is necessary to protect agricultural interests 134 and to foster
innovation and competition among the exchanges.' 3 5 In addition, the
CFTC argues that a jurisdictional realignment would result in "confu-
sion and excess regulation and jeopardize the U.S. futures industry's
preeminence in world financial markets."' 3 6 In an effort to retain the
present jurisdictional scheme, Senator Alan Dixon (D-Ill.) introduced a
bill that would create full voting cross-memberships in each agency.' 3 7
C. Jurisdictional Realignment
The proposal receiving the most broad-based support is one that
would shift jurisdiction over products based on a securities index to the
STOCK MARKET CRASH OF 1987, at 28 [hereinafter GAO CRASH REPORT], reprinted
in Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 322 (Feb. 11, 1988) (special separately bound
volume).
133. Shift of Index Products to SEC Would Weaken CFTC, Gramm Contends, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 481 (Mar. 30, 1990). For a further discus-
sion of the futures industry's effects on the agricultural community, see supra
notes 18 & 28 and accompanying text.
134. SEC, Treasury, Greenspan Support Giving SEC Jurisdiction for Stock Index Fu-
tures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 459 (Mar. 30, 1990) (statement of
Senator Phil Gramm). Senator Gramm's statements about competition among
exchanges appear to be misguided, however. In Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 883
F.2d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990), the court noted
that
[fQutures markets benefit from exclusivity; [securities] trading reduces
the volume of futures trading, and competition doubtless reduces the
commissions as well. Investors, on the other hand, gain from the com-
petition the futures markets dislike. Indeed, unless the creation of a
new means of trading benefits investors (by introducing new financial
instruments or driving down the price of trading) the futures markets
won't file suit.
Id. For a further discussion of the impact of the jurisdictional disputes on finan-
cial innovation, see infra notes 235-47 and accompanying text.
135. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 369 (testimony of Wendy
Gramm, Chairperson, CFTC).
136. Shift of Index Products to SEC Would Weaken CFTC, Gramm Contends, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 481 (Mar. 30, 1990).
137. Id. Senator Dixon's bill was designated S. 2335. Id. Cross-member-
ship would mean that a member of the CFTC would become a full voting mem-
ber of the SEC, and a member of the SEC would become a full voting member of
the CFTC. Id. In another attempt to retain the present jurisdictional alignment,
on February 19, 1991, the House Agriculture Conservation Subcommittee ap-
proved a bill (H.R. 707) that would give the CFTC permanent status with no
changes in its present jurisdiction. House Panel Approves Bill to Give CFTC Perma-
nent Status, Ban Dual Trading, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 301 (Feb.
22, 1991).
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SEC. 13 8 Under this proposal, stock index futures and options on stock
index futures would be regulated by the SEC while the CFTC would
retain jurisdiction over futures on traditional commodities.' 3 9 The ar-
gument in favor of this proposal is two-pronged. First, it has been ar-
gued that the SEC should have jurisdiction over any product related to
the securities markets, particularly those products that have the poten-
tial of exerting a great deal of pressure on securities prices.' 40 Second,
it has been argued that the CFTC should retain jurisdiction over tradi-
tional commodity-based products, because that is the area in which it
has the greater experience and because "nonfinancial futures do not af-
fect other financial markets in the same manner as stock derivative
instruments." 141
In June 1990, the Treasury Department submitted to Congress a
bill entitled the "Capital Markets Competition, Stability, and Fairness
Act of 1990, ' 142 which would shift regulation of stock index futures to
the SEC, modify the CEA's exclusivity clause, overturn the Chicago Mer-
cantile decision and give the CFTC power to exempt currency and inter-
est rate swap agreements from CFTC regulation.' 43 The bill, tied to the
CFTC reauthorization bill, 14 4 did not receive enough support for floor
consideration and was killed during the 1990 session of Congress. 14 5
138. See Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 554-55 (position of Dean
Witter Financial Services), 560 (position of Rodney & Co.), and 571 (position of
Securities Industry Association); SEC, Treasury, Greenspan Support Giving SECJuris-
diction for Stock Index Futures, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 459 (Mar. 30,
1990) (proposal supported by SEC, Treasury Department and Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan); Schick, supra note 6, at 63 (supporting shift
to SEC).
139. Schick, supra note 6, at 63-64.
140. Id.; see also Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 258 (statement of
David Ruder, Chairman, SEC) ("Neither as a matter of regulatory efficiency nor
as a matter of public confidence does it make sense to maintain separate author-
ity over the stock index futures and the stock markets.").
141. Schick, supra note 6, at 64.
142. Treasury Submits Bill to Give SEC Jurisdiction Over Stock Index Futures, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 859 (June 8, 1990).
143. Id.
144. Senators Fail in Last-Minute Effort to Resolve SEC-CFTC Jurisdiction Dispute,
22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1476-77 (Oct. 19, 1990). The CFTC
reauthorization bill was designated S. 1729. Id. at 1477. For a further discus-
sion of this bill, see infra note 246 and accompanying text.
145. Senators Fail in Last-Minute Effort to Resolve SEC-CFTC Jurisdiction Dispute,
22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1477 (Oct. 19, 1990) (bill failed because
of lack of support for proposal requiring SEC and CFTC to share jurisdiction
over index futures). In 1991, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) introduced a bill (S.
207) that would force the CFTC and the SEC to share jurisdiction over any in-
strument that has characteristics of both a future and a security. Any such in-
strument could be traded on either a securities or futures exchange. The bill did
not, however, completely strip the CFTC ofjurisdiction over hybrid instruments
as did the 1990 Treasury Department bill. CFTC Reauthorization Bill Introduced,
SEC Would Share Jurisdiction With CFTC, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at
126 (Jan. 25, 1991).
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D. Merger of the Agencies
Perhaps the most controversial proposal is the total merger or con-
solidation of the agencies. Even some of the most ardent supporters of
a jurisdictional realignment have spoken out against a complete merger,
arguing, for example, that it could stifle innovation. 146 Nevertheless, in
1990, Representatives Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) and Dennis Eckard (D-
Ohio) introduced a bill that would merge the two agencies into a single
entity. 147
VI. SUPPORT FOR A CFTC/SEC CONSOLIDATION
A. Introduction
It is submitted that Congress should consolidate the CFTC and the
SEC into a single regulatory agency in order to end the jurisdictional
disputes between the agencies and to effectively address the problems
now facing the securities, futures and hybrid industries. The factors
pointing to this conclusion are best grouped into two categories: those
that mandate a consolidation and those that will facilitate a consolida-
tion. The factors mandating a consolidation include the problem of
market volatility caused by intermarket trading,' 4 8 the need to address
intermarket issues 14 9 and the stifling of financial innovation. 150 The
factors facilitating a consolidation are the similarities between securities
and futures transactions15 1 and the similarities between the regulation
of the two industries. 152
146. SEC, Treasury, Greenspan Support Giving SEC Jurisdiction for Stock Index Fu-
tures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 459 (Mar. 30, 1990) (statement of
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan). For a discussion of the cur-
rent regulatory scheme's stifling of financial innovation, see infra notes 235-47
and accompanying text.
147. Glickman, Eckart Propose Replacing SEC, CFTC with Super Regulatory
Agency, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 495 (Apr. 6, 1990). The bill,
H.R. 4477, would create a new agency called the Markets and Trading Commis-
sion that would have an entire division devoted solely to the futures industry to
ensure that the securities industry would not be favored over the futures indus-
try. Id.
148. For a discussion of market volatility, see infra notes 153-207 and ac-
companying text.
149. For a discussion of the issues connected with intermarket trading, see
infra notes 208-34 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of how the present jurisdictional system has stifled
financial innovation, see infra notes 235-47 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the similarities between securities and futures
transactions, see infra notes 248-75 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the similarities between the regulation of the secur-
ities and futures industries, see infra notes 276-302 and accompanying text.
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B. Market Volatility
1. Institutional Investors
No analysis of market volatility is complete without a discussion of
the role of institutional investors and program trading. During the
1980s, institutional investors came to dominate trading in the securities
and the index-based futures markets. 15 3 Institutional investors, a class
of investors that typically includes mutual funds, pension and endow-
ment funds and other commercial enterprises, manage over $2 trillion
in assets on behalf of nearly one hundred million individual benefi-
ciaries. 154 Institutions account for over eighty percent of trading in the
securities markets' 55 and as much as ninety-three percent of the trading
in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's S&P 500 index futures. 15 6 Be-
cause of their size and experience advantages over individuals, institu-
tional investors can engage in trading strategies, such as program
trading, 15 7 that individual investors find prohibitive and that impact the
overall market profoundly. 158 In fact, the trading advantages enjoyed
by institutional investors often make individual participants in the secur-
ities markets feel as if they are at the mercy of the institutions.15 9 Never-
theless, institutional investors represent nearly one hundred million
people, many of whom might not otherwise participate in the stock
153. Schick, supra note 6, at 48. For a detailed discussion of institutional
investors and program trading, see id. at 48-53.
154. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 438 (testimony of Leo Me-
lamed, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange). In fact, institutional investors
represent over 33 million mutual fund shareholders and 60 million pension fund
participants and beneficiaries. Id.
155. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 132. According to Senator
Heinz, individuals accounted for only 18.5% of all volume in the securities mar-
kets in 1988. Id.
156. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 507. This figure is supported
by the CME's large trader reporting figures, which indicate that between 80%
and 90% of the S&P 500 index futures volume is traceable to large traders,
those investors with over 100 contracts. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at
106 (CME exhibit).
157. For a discussion of program trading, see infra notes 161-74 and ac-
companying text.
158. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PROGRAM
TRADING: PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF INDEX ARBITRAGE 9-10 (Comm. Print
1987) [hereinafter PROGRAM TRADING REPORT]. This report estimates that $5
million is the minimum commitment for engaging in index arbitrage, while the
average commitment is somewhere between $25 and $50 million. Id. at 10. For
a further discussion on the impact of program trading, see infra notes 159-93
and accompanying text.
159. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 268-69 (testimony of Charles
Schwab, Chairman, Charles Schwab & Co.); see also id. at 277 (Investor Attitudes
Questionnaire prepared by Opinion Research Corporation). According to the
survey, 70% of individual investors believed that institutions dominated activity
in the stock markets too much, while 81% believed that trading in index futures
made understanding the stock market more difficult for individuals. Id.
21
Benson: Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/SEC Consolidation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
market. ' 60
2. Program Trading
Program trading refers to contemporaneous purchases or sales of
large blocks of stock and opposite positions in stock index futures which
are intended to track changes in the value of major market indices. 16
This trading strategy owes its name to the fact that the decision to trade
is often made by a computer program and not by an individual money
manager. 16 2 Although program trading has become a generic term, it
actually encompasses two distinct trading strategies, portfolio insurance
and index arbitrage. 163
Institutional investors relied on portfolio insurance to protect the
value of their investment portfolios prior to the 1987 stock market
break. 164 Portfolio insurance refers to the practice of shifting invest-
ment away from equity securities in a declining stock market in order to
maintain a portfolio's value.1 6 5 Although some investors shifted to
bonds and other debt instruments, 166 thereby maintaining corporate in-
vestment, most investors sought the protection afforded by the stock in-
dex futures markets. 16 7 As stock prices dropped, investors engaging in
portfolio insurance would liquidate their stock investments, thereby fur-
ther depressing stock prices, and acquire positions in index futures;
once stocks became sufficiently discounted, investors would reinvest in
the stock market. 168 The 1987 stock market break showed, however,
160. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 438.
161. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 268-69 (testimony of Charles
Schwab).
162. R. HAMILTON, supra note 57, at 491-92.
163. Schick, supra note 6, at 50-52. For a discussion of portfolio insurance,
see infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. For a discussion of index arbi-
trage, see infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
164. Pickard & Axe, The History and Mechanics of Index Futures and Program
Trading, in TRADING PRACTICES, THE PORTFOLIO EXECUTION PROCESS, AND SOFT
DOLLAR PRACTICES 1990, at 83, 93-94 (1990) (Practising Law Institute, Corpo-
rate Law and Practice Course Handbook No. 684).
165. Id. Because of its asset protection feature, portfolio insurance has
been compared to traditional "stop-loss" orders, which are placed with one's
broker to sell a particular security once its price drops to a certain level. SEC
CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 1-2.
166. Pickard & Axe, supra note 164, at 93.
167. Id. As stock prices fell, investors engaging in portfolio insurance sold
index futures. Id. Thus, investors engaging in portfolio insurance used index
futures to hedge against declines in the value of their underlying commodity
holdings, their securities portfolios, in much the same way as grain producers
sell grain futures to protect against declines in grain prices. Id. By selling index
futures in the face of declining stock prices, investors engaging in portfolio in-
surance were theoretically perfectly hedging their securities portfolios. SEC
CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 1-2. For further discussion of the hedging role
of futures, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
168. SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 1-2. Although early portfolio
insurance practices involved the purchase of baskets of stocks to offset potential
1196 [Vol. 36: p. 1175
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that portfolio insurance could not adequately protect portfolio value
and therefore, the strategy is rarely employed today. 16 9
The second and far more controversial form of program trading is
index arbitrage. Index arbitrage refers to the practice of contemporane-
ously buying and selling opposing positions in the stock and stock index
futures markets in order to capitalize on minute valuation differences in
a stock index future and its underlying stock index. 170 Index arbitrage
is basically a riskless form of trading. As long as the performance of the
securities bought or sold in the trade matches the performance of the
underlying index, the arbitrageur's profit, the difference in the value of
the index and the index future, minus transaction costs, is fixed at the
time of the trade.' 7 '
Index arbitrage impacts the securities markets in two ways. First,
many investors believe that trading in the futures market signals positive
or negative sentiment which then translates into higher or lower stock
prices.' 7 2 Second, the expiration of futures contracts can result in se-
vere short-term price volatility as arbitrageurs conduct massive trades in
the securities markets in order to close out their positions. 173 Because
arbitrage can have a profound impact on securities prices otherwise un-
related to economic factors, and arbitrageurs are mainly large institu-
tional investors, individual investors and many large brokerage houses
tend to assail index arbitrage and blame much of the stock market's
woes on the strategy.' 74
3. Evidence of Excessive Market Volatility Caused by Intermarket Trading
By all accounts, the securities and securities-based futures markets
have become a linked marketplace, used almost interchangeably by insti-
losses in the existing portfolio, investors soon switched to index futures because
trading in one single product, index futures, involved lower transaction costs
and time expenditures. Id.
169. Pickard & Axe, supra note 164, at 93-94.
170. PROGRAM TRADING REPORT, supra note 158, at 1-2.
171. Id. at 2. In order to engage in index arbitrage, an arbitrageur has to
purchase a variety of stocks in an attempt to recreate the underlying security. See
id. As long as the stocks purchased match the performance of the underlying
index, the arbitrageur can realize a profit from the transaction. See id. at 3. If,
however, the stocks fail to match the underlying index, the arbitrageur runs the
risk of not realizing a profit. See id.
172. Pickard & Axe, supra note 164, at 96. Pickard and Axe noted that "the
underlying market value of index futures traded daily generally exceeds the dol-
lar volume on the NYSE. Accordingly, market movements are now frequently
observed first in the futures markets." Id. at 97.
173. PROGRAM TRADING REPORT, supra note 158, at 22.
174. See Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 268-69, 277 (testimony of
Charles Schwab and results of investor survey conducted by Opinion Research
Corporation). In his testimony concerning index arbitrage, Charles Schwab
stated that the average American investor "loses confidence when blue-chip
stocks are whipsawed by rapid, computer-driven trading that has nothing to do
with the stocks' fundamental value." Id. at 269.
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tutional investors.' 75 Events in the futures market can have a profound
impact on the related securities market. 176 The impact can be so great
that many investors now believe that market swings are initiated in the
futures markets. 177 Price fluctuations that reflect changing investor atti-
tudes are not inherently damaging to the securities markets. However,
when severe fluctuations over short periods of time are caused by factors
other than economic considerations, the integrity of the securities mar-
kets may be imperiled. 178 Although excessive market volatility is not
caused by the present jurisdictional structure, its failure to effectively
address the problems caused by intermarket trading has exacerbated the
problems.1 79 Thus, it is submitted that a consolidation of the CFTC and
the SEC is necessary to effectively address the problem of excessive mar-
ket volatility caused by trading in related, interchangeable markets. The
175. BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at vi ("From an economic viewpoint, what
have been traditionally seen as separate markets-the markets for stocks, stock
index futures, and stock options-are in fact one market. Under ordinary cir-
cumstances, these marketplaces move sympathetically, linked by financial instru-
ments, trading strategies, market participants and clearing and credit
mechanisms."); GAO CRASH REPORT, supra note 132, at 95 ("[T]he October
trading exemplifies the significance and ramifications of the new futures, options
and equity market linkages and trading strategies, as well as the development of
new broad market interests of institutions.").
176. GAO CRASH REPORT, supra note 132, at 95 (linked futures and securi-
ties markets can "contribute to creating an atmosphere that could disrupt confi-
dence and greatly complicate decisionmaking by investors, portfolio managers,
SRO officials and federal regulators").
177. Pickard & Axe, supra note 164, at 96. This argument is supported by
the general role of futures in discovering the proper price of the underlying
commodity. Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 1137, 1151 (7th Cir.) (futures
trading "serves legitimate hedging and price discovery functions, thereby facili-
tating production of the underlying commodity"), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026
(1982).
178. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 219 (testimony of David
Ruder, Chairman, SEC). Chairman Ruder stated that
[w]hile limited price volatility that reflects fundamental changes in buy-
ing and selling interest is not inherently bad or damaging to the mar-
kets, extreme price movements in short periods of time can have a
number of damaging effects. First, extreme price volatility can increase
substantially the risk encountered by market makers and may have long
term effects on market liquidity. Second, more volatile markets can de-
crease the ability of broker-dealers to use their capital effectively. To
the extent risk of loss increases substantially, firms may be required to
maintain greater capital reserves to satisfy both creditors and regula-
tors. Finally, such volatility may make it more difficult for corporations
to raise equity capital by decreasing the willingness of the public to in-
vest directly in the stock market.
Id. at 219-20.
179. BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at vi; see also Financial Market Hearings,
supra note 7, at 258 (testimony of David Ruder, Chairman, SEC). Chairman
Ruder testified that "[n]either as a matter of regulatory efficiency nor as a matter
of public confidence does it make sense to maintain separate authority over the
stock index futures and the stock markets." Financial Market Hearings, supra note
7, at 258.
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remainder of this section will focus on the cascade theory, l8 0 the triple
witching hour phenomenon' 8 ' and trading activity surrounding the Oc-
tober 1987 market break' 8 2 to demonstrate how intermarket trading can
in fact cause market volatility.
The cascade theory indicates precisely how intermarket trading can
lead to and further exacerbate volatile price swings. The theory begins
with the assumption that large institutional investors are using index fu-
tures to hedge positions in the securities markets.' 8 3 When portfolio
managers learn of bad economic news, they will hedge their equity posi-
tions by selling index futures. This selling spree will cause index futures
to become discounted in relation to their underlying indices. 184 Dis-
counted futures will induce index arbitrageurs to buy futures and sell
stock contemporaneously.' 8 5 The selling activity by arbitrageurs will
further deflate stock prices, thereby initiating a new round of index fu-
tures selling by hedging portfolio managers. Thus, the use of index fu-
tures to hedge equity positions, i.e. portfolio insurance, could, in the
face of adverse economic news, lead to crashing stock prices which
would end only when stocks were sufficiently undervalued so as to in-
duce buying.' 8 6 Although the possibility of a cascade actually occurring
180. For a discussion of the cascade theory, see infra notes 183-87 and ac-
companying text.
181. For a discussion of the triple witching hour phenomenon, see infra
notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of the trading activity surrounding the stock market
break of October 1987, see infra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
183. GAO CRASH REPORT, supra note 132, at 31. For a discussion of hedg-
ing, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. For a discussion of portfolio
insurance, see supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
184. Pickard & Axe, supra note 164, at 97. Under normal circumstances,
the value of the index future should closely track the value of its underlying
index. Id. When large sales of index futures in the futures markets are not ac-
companied by large purchases in the stock markets, however, as would be the
case in a cascade scenario, the price of the index future will fall below the corre-
sponding value of the underlying securities index. GAO CRASH REPORT, supra
note 132, at 31. This imbalance will in turn induce trading by index arbi-
trageurs. Id.
185. PROGRAM TRADING REPORT, supra note 158, at 2-3. The imbalance be-
tween the price of the index futures and the value of the underlying index will
ensure the arbitrageur a profit on the transaction. Id. For a discussion of the
mechanics of an index arbitrage transaction, see supra notes 170-71 and accom-
panying text.
186. GAO CRASH REPORT, supra note 132, at 31. The cascade theory has
encountered a considerable amount of criticism, particularly from the CFTC and
the futures industry. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION STAFF, STOCK
INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY-OCTOBER 1987. 32-33 [hereinafter
CFTC CRASH REPORT], reprinted in [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 24,117 (Jan. 29, 1988). The CFTC argues that the cascade theory
ignores the stabilizing effect of index future purchases by speculators (arbi-
trageurs) and that the second cycle of hedging is unlikely because short hedging
becomes more expensive when futures are underpriced relative to stock prices.
Id. In addition, other commentators have suggested that the SEC's short sale
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has decreased along with the use of portfolio insurance, the theory
clearly illustrates how unfettered trading in the index futures market can
lead to volatile price changes in the underlying securities market.
18 7
A variant of the cascade theory is the triple witching hour phenome-
non. The triple witching hour refers to the last hour of trading on the
date that stock options, stock index options and stock index futures all
expire. 18 8 When index futures expire, the value of the future will equal
the value of the underlying index. 189 Index arbitrageurs traditionally
wait until the last hour of trading to liquidate their arbitrage positions,
either by buying or selling stock, thereby causing severe order imbal-
ances and short term price volatility. 190 In an attempt to curb such vio-
lent market activity, the New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, the markets most affected by triple witching hour
activity, entered into an agreement whereby the expiration of the S&P's
500 futures contract was moved to the open of trading on Fridays, in-
stead of the close of trading. 19 1 Although this agreement has reduced
the bulk of triple witching hour activity, market volatility surrounding
"expiration Fridays" is still possible for two reasons. 192 First, moving
the expiration of the S&P 500 contract to Friday's opening merely makes
regulations will prevent much of the selling activity and that bottomed-out stock
prices will induce large-scale stock buying. GAO CRASH REPORT, supra note 132,
at 31. The SEC, however, maintains that a cascade could still occur despite the
aforementioned factors. SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 1-10.
187. See Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 32 (testimony ofJohn Phe-
lan, Chairman and CEO, NYSE). Among the reforms that should reduce the
likelihood of a cascade are an agreement between the New York Stock Exchange
and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to suspend trading in the S&P 500 futures
contract for one hour if the value of the contract falls 12 points (equivalent to a
96 point drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average) and a coordinated circuit-
breaker under which all U.S. securities and futures markets will suspend trading
in the event of a 250 point decline in the Dow from the last day's close. Id. at 32,
40. For a discussion of portfolio insurance, see supra notes 164-69 and accompa-
nying text.
188. Schick, supra note 6, at 53.
189. Id. The value of index futures always equals the value of the underly-
ing index at the time of expiration, because the price of the futures contract is
recalculated daily to reflect that day's changes in the underlying index. Pickard
& Axe, supra note 164, at 95. Thus, as the index future expires, its price is being
recalculated to equal the value of the underlying index. See id.
190. Schick, supra note 6, at 53. The last hour of trading is critical to an
index arbitrage transaction. Id. In order to close out the transaction, the arbi-
trageur must both settle obligations created by the futures contract, normally by
offset or cash settlement, and liquidate the portfolio of stock that theoretically is
tracking the performance of the underlying'index. PROGRAM TRADING REPORT,
supra note 158, at 2-3. Because the value of the index future will equal the value
of the underlying index at the time of expiration, the arbitrageurs wait to liqui-
date until the value of the index has all but been determined, which is normally
shortly before the end of trading on expiration day. Schick, supra note 6, at 53.
191. Market Reform Hearing, supra note 64, at 41 (testimony ofJohn Phelan,
Chairman and CEO, NYSE).
192. Schick, supra note 6, at 53.
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the final hour of trading on Thursday more susceptible to volatility.' 9 3
Second, the agreement does not include the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change and the American Stock Exchange, the largest index options
markets,19 4 or the Chicago Board of Trade, Kansas City Board of Trade
or the New York Mercantile Exchange, the other exchanges trading in-
dex futures, thereby keeping open the possibility of some volatility
caused by expiration Friday.
195
The final evidence of excessive market volatility caused by in-
termarket trading is the trading activity surrounding the October 1987
stock market break. Although all studies on the market break agree that
intermarket trading did not cause the market break, most assert that
such trading activity exacerbated the decline. 19 6 Although index arbi-
trage played a limited role on October 19, 1987, the recognized date of
the "crash," it played a significant role in the tumultuous days preceding
the market decline. 19 7 Index arbitrageurs accounted for between ten
and fifteen percent of the sell volume on the New York Stock Exchange
during the week before the break. 19 8 Since Friday, October 16, 1987,
was the expiration date of most index options and the CBOT's Major
Market Index future, arbitrage activity was concentrated in the last hour
193. Id. The last hour of trading on Thursdays will become vulnerable to
volatile price swings as index arbitrageurs sell large blocks of stock in order to
match the value of the underlying index as it will open on Friday. Id.; see also,
Pickard & Axe, supra note 164, at 95. Because only the arbitrageurs using index
futures will be selling off on Thursday afternoons, this price volatility should not
be as severe as on earlier expiration Fridays where traders with positions in in-
dex options and stock options would sell large blocks of stock in order to wind-
up their positions. See id.; see also Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 42
(testimony of John Phelan, Chairman and CEO, NYSE).
194. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 42 (testimony ofJohn Phelan,
Chairman and CEO, NYSE).
195. Id. at 41-43. The only parties to the agreement are the New York
Stock Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the only index future
covered by the agreement is the CME's S&P 500 future. Id. Thus, all index
options and all of the other index futures still expire on Fridays. Id. at 42.
Although the S&P 500 contract accounts for two thirds of all index futures trad-
ing, the expiration of index options and futures on Fridays still creates imbal-
ances and some volatile price swings. Id.
196. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at 69; SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note
67, at xiii ("[Flutures trading and strategies involving the use of futures were not
the 'sole cause' of the market break. Nevertheless, [these strategies] were a sig-
nificant factor in accelerating and exacerbating the declines."); GAO CRAsH RE-
PORT, supra note 132, at 49 ("It does seem clear, however, that the relationship
between futures prices and cash market prices ... had some effect on investors'
perceptions of events."). But see CFTC CRASH REPORT, supra note 186, at 137
("A detailed examination of the trading data ... does not provide empirical
support for the theory that hedging in the futures market and index arbitrage
activities interacted to cause a technical downward price spiral of stock prices.").
197. CFTC CRASH REPORT, supra note 186, at 38.
198. Id. On Wednesday, October 14, 1987, index arbitrageurs accounted
for 13.4% of the total sell volume on the New York Stock Exchange, 6.2% on
Thursday, October 15, and 11% on Friday, October 16. Id.
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of trading. 199 This heavy arbitrage activity undoubtedly added signifi-
cantly to the sell pressure which built over the weekend, 20 0 the large
discount in the CME's S&P 500 future on Monday morning20 ' and the
massive dumping of stock by institutional investors during the first hour
of trading on Monday. 20 2 Although index arbitrage and other forms of
intermarket trading clearly did not cause the unprecedented decline on
October 19, 1987, the mere fact that it played a minor, exacerbating role
is cause for great concern.20 3
4. The Need for Regulatory Consolidation to Address Market Volatility
The preceding sections have shown how trading in the index fu-
tures market can cause serious volatility in the underlying securities
markets.20 4 While the CFTC regulates the index futures and the SEC
199. See id. at vii; SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 2-36. Index arbi-
trage selling was particularly heavy between 3:10 p.m. and 3:40 p.m., at times
accounting for over 60% of all NYSE volume. Id. Index arbitrageurs sold nearly
twelve million shares on the NYSE during Friday's final hour of trading. Id. at 2-
35. For a discussion of the effect that options and futures expiration have on
stock prices, see supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
200. GAO CRASH REPORT, supra note 130, at 42.
201. Id. When the NYSE opened on Monday, the S&P 500 futures contract
was discounted 21 points from the value of the S&P index. Id.
202. Id.
203. The role of intermarket trading in the market break is cause for con-
cern because the market came very close to suffering a true cascade. The S&P
500 futures contract was discounted 21 points when the NYSE opened on Mon-
day, October 19, 1987. Id. In the first hour of trading on Monday, program
trading sales accounted for between 5% and 60% of all NYSE volume, with in-
dex arbitrage activity responsible for over 75% of this amount. SEC CRASH RE-
PORT, supra note 67, at 2-38 to 2-39. During the first hour of trading, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average fell almost 200 points. Id. at 2-13. Falling stock prices
in turn caused traders engaging in portfolio insurance to begin selling index
futures. In fact, portfolio insurance sales of S&P 500 futures contracts ac-
counted for 30% of all CME futures volume between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.
and approximately 45% of all CME volume between 12:00 p.m. and 12:30 p.m.
Id. at 2-40. This futures selling activity caused the S&P 500 futures contract to
become discounted eight points from the S&P 500 index by 12:30 p.m. (after
having briefly regained its proper position somewhat close to the value of the
index). BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at III- 19. At approximately 1:10 p.m., pro-
gram selling increased to a point where it accounted for over 60% of the NYSE
volume for three ten-minute intervals before 2:00 p.m. SEC CRASH REPORT,
supra note 67, at 2-39. This intense selling spree caused the Dow to drop 100
points between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at 111-17.
As a result of this precipitous decline in stock prices, portfolio insurers stepped
up their sales of index futures. SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 2-40.
Although the foregoing events do not necessarily mean that a cascade actually
occurred, the fact that otherwise independent events occurred in the order envi-
sioned in the cascade theory supports the argument that intermarket trading
could potentially lead to a market disaster. For a discussion of the mechanics of
the cascade theory, see supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of market volatility, see supra notes 175-203 and ac-
companying text.
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regulates the underlying securities markets, neither agency has the au-
thority to address directly the market volatility caused by intermarket
trading.20 5 Any progress in this direction requires either cooperation
between the exchanges or between the agencies. Although inter-ex-
change cooperation has been somewhat successful, 20 6 inter-agency co-
operation has been limited and is very unlikely to occur in the near
future.20 7 Thus, Congress must take the steps necessary to ensure
proper regulation of intermarket trading, and consolidation of the agen-
cies is the most logical means of achieving this goal.
C. Intermarket Issues
1. Introduction
The 1987 market break clearly indicated that technical reforms were
needed to alleviate the problems associated with intermarket trading.
Among the reforms most urgently needed were coordinated clearing
and settlement mechanisms, 20 8 consistent margin requirements for se-
curities and securities-based futures20 9 and implemented circuit break-
ers and emergency powers. 2 10 Although some of these reforms have
been partially achieved through inter-exchange agreements, inter-
agency cooperation will be needed to achieve all such measures. 2 1 1 Be-
cause this degree of cooperation is highly unlikely in light of the recent
conflicts between the agencies,2 1 2 Congress should intervene and force
cooperation through a consolidation of the agencies.
205. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at 59.
206. See, e.g., Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 32-33 (testimony of
John Phelan, Chairman and CEO, NYSE). Examples of inter-exchange coopera-
tion include a NYSE-CME agreement to take certain actions when the value of
the S&P futures contract declines 12 points, an inter-exchange hotline for the
sharing of information, agreements on intermarket fr6ntrunning and a NYSE-
CME agreement on the timing of the expiration of the S&P 500 futures contract.
Id.
207. See Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 499 (statement of Repre-
sentative Rinaldo) ("One of the ... reasons for the formation of the working
group was that.., there was a lack of coordination between the markets and the
regulators.").
208. BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at vii. For a discussion of clearing and
settlement mechanisms, see infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
209. Id. For a discussion of margin requirements, see infra notes 218-27
and accompanying text.
210. Id. For a discussion of circuit breakers and emergency powers, see
infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
211. See Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 40 (testimony ofJohn Phe-
lan, Chairman and CEO, NYSE) (circuit breaker agreement between NYSE and
CME); Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 470 (testimony of John Phelan,
Chairman and CEO, NYSE) (NYSE and CME working to confront intermarket
frontrunning problem).
212. For a discussion of the recent disputes between the SEC and the
CFTC, see supra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
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2. Coordinated Clearing and Settlement
At present, the clearing and settlement of a futures or securities
transaction occurs in the exchange's clearinghouse. 21 3 This system
poses two problems when faced with contemporaneous trading on se-
curities and futures exchanges. First, an index arbitrage trade, in which
an investor focuses on the price discrepancy between a stock index and
its related futures contract, requires two separate clearing and settle-
ment transactions. 2 14 Even though the investor is essentially "buying
into" one market, he must do so in two separate marketplaces which
may employ vastly different procedures. Second, the disjointed system
of clearing prevents a clearinghouse from accurately gauging the in-
termarket exposure of its customers. 21 5 These problems become partic-
ularly acute when an investor trades on margin in both the securities and
futures markets. 2 16 Although the agencies, exchanges and commenta-
tors agree that the clearing and settlement of securities and related fu-
tures must be coordinated, there has been little progress in this
direction. 21 7
3. Consistent Margin Requirements
Margins, the extension of credit in a securities or futures transac-
tion, have attracted a great deal of attention since the 1987 market
break.2 ' 8 The SEC and securities industry have argued that lower mar-
gin requirements for index futures enable speculators to acquire large
futures positions on credit, thereby increasing the potential for volatility
in the securities markets. 21 9 Presently, margins on securities, estab-
213. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 66. The major responsibility of
the clearinghouse is to ensure that sales of securities or futures match with
purchases. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18, at § 1.31.
214. BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at 64 ("The complexity and fragmenta-
tion of the separate clearing mechanisms in stocks, futures and options . . .
brought the financial system to the brink on Tuesday, October 20.").
215. Id. ("No clearinghouse is able to assess accurately intermarket expo-
sure among its clearing members and among their customers. Separate clearing
also hampers lenders in assessing the risk exposure of market participants
....").
216. Id.
217. Id. at vi; see also Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 234 (letter to
Senator Dodd from Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury) ("[T]he proper
functioning of clearance and settlement systems is integral to the proper func-
tioning of the financial markets as a whole."). A bill, known as the Coordinated
Clearance and Settlement Act of 1990, requiring the SEC to establish a linked or
coordinated clearing system was introduced in Congress in 1990. H.R. 3656,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
218. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at vii.
219. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 246 (testimony of David
Ruder, Chairman, SEC). Chairman Ruder testified that "[f]utures products en-
joy greater leverage in part because they are cash-settled and have lower mar-
gins. This greater leverage permits major long futures positions to be
established with relatively small initial capital." Id. (footnote omitted).
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lished by the Federal Reserve Board, are set at fifty percent of the total
purchase price.220 Thus, an investor can buy $100,000 worth of stock
by paying $50,000 down and receiving $50,000 of credit. Futures mar-
gins, presently established by the individual futures exchanges, are gen-
erally set far below the margins on securities. 22 ' For example, the
margin requirement for the S&P 500 futures has typically hovered
around fifteen percent of the value of the contract. 22 2 Thus, for an ini-
tial investment of $15,000, an investor could acquire S&P 500 futures
with a value of $100,000.
The futures exchanges justify this margin discrepancy by arguing
that futures margins play a fundamentally different role than securities
margins.2 23 Although a futures margin is a grant of credit, it is also
collateral which serves to ensure a party's performance under the con-
tract.2 2 4 The exchanges also argue that the daily marking-to-market fea-
ture of futures contracts, pursuant to which a trader must pay additional
money if the value of the contract falls below a certain maintenance
level, entitles the exchanges to set futures margins at a level below se-
curities margins.2 2 5 Securities officials concede that futures margins
need not be set at fifty percent, but argue that they should be set at a
level above fifteen percent in order to remove leveraging advantages. 22 6
Despite the attractiveness of the futures exchanges' arguments,
220. Id. Margins for institutional investors in the securities markets, how-
ever, are established by their creditors and can run as low as 20% to 30% of the
value of the securities being acquired. Id. at 334 (testimony of Wendy Gramm,
Chairperson of CFTC).
221. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 71. A 1990 compromise measure
tied to the CFTC reauthorization bill attempted to shift regulation of futures
margins to the Federal Reserve Board, but the measure never made it to the
floor of Congress. Senators Fail in Last-Minute Effort to Resolve SEC-CFTCJurisdic-
tion Dispute, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, 1476-77 (Oct. 19, 1990).
CFTC Commissioner William Albrecht argued that if futures margins were in-
creased, "individual investors-like Goldilocks of Goldilocks and the Three Bears-
will say: 'These margins are too high, these returns are too soft, these regula-
tions are too hard.' These investors will leave the U.S. markets and 'find a mar-
ket that is just right.' " Id. at 1476.
222. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 407 (testimony of Leo Me-
lamed, Chairman of CME).
223. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS: SUBCOMM.
ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE REGU-
LATION OF FUTURES MARGINS 1 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter FUTURES MAR-
GINS REPORT]; see also Review of Recent Volatility in the Stock Market and the Stock Index
Futures Market, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Conservation, Credit and Rural Develop-
ment of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1987) (testimony
of Kalo Hineman, Acting Chairman, CFTC) (increasing futures margins to 50%
would be analogous to "saying that the insurance on a house should be the same
amount of money as the down payment on a house").
224. FUTURES MARGINS REPORT, supra note 223, at 2. The report analo-
gized futures margins to performance bonds. Id.
225. Id. Thus, a futures margin must be set at a level sufficient to protect
against only a single day's price movements. Id.
226. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 240-49 (testimony of David
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margins on index futures should be set at a level theoretically compara-
ble to securities margins. Futures margins, although an assurance of
performance, are nonetheless credit transactions in which an investor
can acquire a very valuable asset for a small down-payment. If the value
of the contract never falls below the maintenance requirement, the in-
vestor will never be required to pay additional money. Therefore, with a
small initial investment, a trader can acquire a significant position in the
index futures market with which to engage in arbitrage or other in-
termarket trading techniques. 2 2 7
4. Unified Circuit Breakers and Emergency Powers
The volatile trading session of October 19, 1987, indicated that ac-
tions taken on one exchange or by one regulator can have a profound
impact on other related markets. On that day, rumors of the impending
closing of the New York Stock Exchange sent shock waves through the
securities and futures markets and resulted in the halting of trading in
S&P 500 futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 2 28 Because of
this closing, many traders were unable to liquidate open futures posi-
tions or utilize index futures to hedge positions in the falling securities
market. 229 Furthermore, activity on October 13, 1989, also reflected
the impact of trading events in one market on a related market. On that
day, trading in the S&P 500 future was halted for an hour, pursuant to a
newly implemented circuit breaker, 230 because the value of the future
had dropped twelve points. 23 1 The trading halt temporarily abated the
general stock market decline as well as the rate of index arbitrage selling
activity. 23 2 Once the trading halt was lifted, however, the price decline
Ruder, Chairman, SEC). The SEC suggested that a margin level of 20% to 25%
for futures would reduce the leverage advantage. Id. at 248-49.
227. For a discussion of index arbitrage and its effect on the securities mar-
kets, see supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
228. GAO CRASH REPORT, supra note 132, at 92. The CME halted trading
in index futures because officials feared that the closing of other markets would
cause anxious investors to swamp the CME, thereby severely devaluing the S&P
500 futures contract. Id. In addition to the CME, the CBOE, Kansas City Board
of Trade, New York Futures Exchange, American Stock Exchange and Philadel-
phia Stock Exchange all halted index-related trading. Id. at 92 & n.2. Chicago
Board of Trade, however, never halted index trading. Id.
229. Id. at 93.
230. A circuit breaker is an automatic trading halt that is triggered when
trading activity reaches a certain level. BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at 66.
231. Shock Absorbers Did Not Curb Volatility in Oct. 1989 Market Swings, Report
Says, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 774 (May 18, 1990) (report by
CFTC's Divisions of Economic Analysis and Trading and Markets on the Octo-
ber 1989 stock market decline). For a discussion of the circuit breaker involved
in this market decline, see supra note 187.
232. DIvIsION OF MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N,
TRADING ANALYSIS OF OCTOBER 13 AND 16, 1989, reprinted in [1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,603 (May 1990) (report of SEC's Division
of Market Regulation on October 1989 stock market decline).
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resumed. 233 Although general circuit breakers are already in place to
slow precipitous declines in the securities and futures markets, no
agency has the authority to exercise other forms of emergency powers,
such as delaying openings or closing entire markets, over the entire se-
curities and securities-based futures markets.23 4 Such emergency pow-
ers would be most effective if both markets were already subject to
regulation by the agency exercising the emergency powers; thus, the
need for emergency powers supports a consolidation of the agencies.
D. Stifling of Financial Innovation
1. Index Participations
The clearest example of the carnage wrought by the jurisdictional
conflict is the death of the index participation. 23 5 In Chicago Mercantile,
the Seventh Circuit held that index participations, although not specifi-
cally futures, fell within the CFTC's jurisdiction under the exclusivity
clause and, therefore, could not be traded on securities exchanges. 23 6
The Seventh Circuit noted that "the IP was designed as a novel instru-
ment so that it could offer attributes previously missing in the mar-
ket."' 23 7 Nevertheless, in one fell swoop, a beneficial financial
instrument 23 8 which had been developed over several years239 and
which had been recommended as a means of preventing future stock
market crashes2 40 was removed from the financial scene. The Chicago
233. Id.
234. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 40 (testimony of John Phelan,
Chairman and CEO, NYSE). The exchanges have entered into an agreement
that all U.S. securities and futures markets will close for one hour should the
Dow Jones Industrial Average drop 250 points from the close of the previous
day's trading. Id. Although this is a start, the triggering event is most likely set
at an unrealistically high level. Id. at 271 (testimony of Charles Schwab, Chair-
man, Charles Schwab & Co.). A 250 point drop in the Dow is equivalent to the
percentage decline in the October 1929 stock market crash. Id. Thus, until the
Dow drops an amount equalling the 1929 stock market crash, the only operative
circuit breaker will be the CME's trading halt when the S&P 500 futures contract
drops 12 points. The volatility of October 13, 1989, when trading in the S&P
contract was halted for an hour, indicated that circuit breakers which affect only
one market do more harm than good. Shock Absorbers Did Not Curb Volatility in Oct.
1989 Market Swings, Report Says, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 774
(May 18, 1990) (report of CFTC's Divisions of Economic Analysis and Trading
and Markets on October 1989 stock market decline).
235. For a discussion of index participations and the Chicago Mercantile deci-
sion, see supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
236. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d 537, 550 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990).
237. Id. at 546. For a discussion of the unusual attributes of the various
index participations, see supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
238. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 132 (statement of Senator
John Heinz). For the full text of this statement, see supra note 115.
239. See POWER OF SIMPLICITY, supra note 104, at 4. The Philadelphia Stock
Exchange began development of its CIP in 1985. Id.
240. SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 3-18. The SEC suggested that
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Mercantile decision, and the jurisdictional disputes in general, have re-
sulted in "a substantial risk in creating, marketing, or investing in many
new products" which are not clearly either securities or futures. 24 '
2. Off-Exchange Hybrid Instruments
Off-exchange hybrids are financial products with characteristics of
both securities and futures that are sold over-the-counter. 24 2 For exam-
ple, an oil company may issue debt instruments with interest rates tied
to oil prices or an international corporation may issue securities accom-
panied by warrants to purchase foreign currencies.2 43 The principal ad-
vantages of such hybrid instruments is that they provide a relatively
inexpensive means of raising capital as well as allowing companies to
hedge against rising commodities prices. 2 44 Because hybrid products
have elements of a futures contract, they are subject to the provisions of
the Commodities Exchange Act and more importantly, the rule requir-
ing all futures contracts to be sold on registered futures exchanges. 24 5
Although the CFTC is in the process of formulating exemptions for such
hybrid products, 246 the uncertainty surrounding this prospect has
slowed product development and even driven some products, such as
swaps, to overseas markets. 247
the exchanges, particularly the NYSE, study the feasibility of market basket trad-
ing of stocks on the stock exchange as an alternative to index arbitrage transac-
tions involving both the securities and futures markets. Id. This proposal would
cut down on transaction costs and ameliorate the volatile impact of index arbi-
trage, while still allowing investors to play the market as a whole. Id.
241. Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 83. The risks involved with new
hybrid instruments include a loss of the time and money expended by the ex-
changes in creating the products, the difficulty that brokerage houses face in
marketing products with "legal clouds" and the possibility that investors could
lose the value of their investments. Id.
242. Gerstell, Developments in Off-Exchange Financial Products, 21 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 1, 1-2 (1988).
243. Id.
244. Id. For example, an oil company could tie interest rates on its bonds
to the price of oil. Id. This way, the cost of borrowed money would decline as
the value of the company's product declined, thereby protecting the company's
balance sheet. Id.
245. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (definition of "contract of sale" under CEA).
246. Russo & Mitchell, Commodity Price Exposure Management, in NEW DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN COMMODITY FUTURES REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 1989, at 475,
489 (1989) (Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Hand-
book No. 667). A bill introduced in Congress in 1990 would give the CFTC
express authority to exempt currency and interest rate swap agreements from
CFTC regulation; the bill, however, never made it to floor consideration. Sena-
tors Fail in Last-Minute Effort to Resolve SEC-CFTCJurisdiction Dispute, 22 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA), No. 41, at 1477 (Oct. 19, 1990).
247. Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 86. The exemption process is
being slowed by the futures exchanges which "fear[] that the new financial prod-
ucts will siphon away dollars and participants." Gerstell, supra note 242, at 2.
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E. Similarity of Transactions
1. In General
The previously stated factors mandate a consolidation of the SEC
and the CFTC 2 48 The following sections will discuss several factors
which will facilitate a consolidation of the agencies. One of the CFTC's
major arguments for retaining the present jurisdictional system is that
the CFTC regulates futures, and futures transactions are fundamentally
different than securities transactions. 24 9 This section will demonstrate,
however, that, despite some differences, futures and securities transac-
tions occur in a similar fashion and for similar purposes.
2. Form of Transactions
Opponents of a jurisdictional realignment argue strenuously that
futures transactions are fundamentally different than securities transac-
tions.2 50 Futures trading basically entails the formation of a contract for
the future delivery of a commodity.2 5 1 Any profit realized from the
transaction is generally traceable to movements in the price of the un-
derlying commodity during the life of the contract.2 52 Despite the close
ties to the underlying commodity, most futures contracts are extin-
guished prior to delivery through offset or cash settlement.25 3 Thus, a
futures contract is no more than a cash transaction which results in the
passage of title to rights in an asset, specifically in a commodity.
Securities transactions can take several forms including sales of
stocks, bonds and investment contracts.2 54 Profits from securities trans-
actions generally result from the efforts of another person or entity.
255
Nevertheless, a securities trade is basically a cash transaction which re-
sults in the passage of title to rights in an asset, in most cases a portion
248. For a discussion of the factors mandating a consolidation of the SEC
and the CFTC, see supra notes 148-247 and accompanying text.
249. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 369 (testimony of Wendy
Gramm, Chairperson, CFTC). Chairperson Gramm testified that "the CFTC is
the professional agency that regulates futures markets .... I don't see anything
that Ijurisdictional realignment] would add, except to confusion and excess reg-
ulation and complications in the regulatory structure that already exists. " Id.
250. See id. For a discussion of the nature and characteristics of futures con-
tracts, see supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
251. Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future
Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L. J. 1175, 1176 (1978) ("Fu-
tures contracts are not sold or traded ... they are formed and discharged.").
252. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 63.
253. Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). For a discussion of the practice of offset, see supra
notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
254. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). For a discussion of securities transac-
tions, see supra notes 54-56 & 66-68 and accompanying text.
255. S.E.C. v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). The other
important characteristics of a security are an investment of money and a com-
mon enterprise. Id.
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of a corporation or other entity's profits. 25 6 In addition to cash transac-
tions, margin rules permit traders in both the securities and futures mar-
kets to acquire positions in these markets on credit with just a small
initial payment. 25 7
Futures and securities trades are not only similar economic transac-
tions, they are also similar in form. On both futures and securities ex-
changes, trades occur in designated areas using a verbal, competitive
bidding system. 258 Thus, the economics and the form of the trade are
similar enough to defeat the argument that securities and futures trans-
actions are fundamentally different.
3. Market Participants
The preceding section demonstrated that, while there are some dif-
ferences in the products involved in securities and futures transactions,
the basic economic form of the transactions are the same: cash or credit
transactions resulting in the passage of title to rights in an asset. 25 9 This
section will focus on the similarity between participants in the securities
and futures markets,2 60 with a particular emphasis on those parties that
trade in both markets.
2 6 1
Several distinct groups are involved in securities and futures trad-
ing. For the most part, participants in both the securities and futures
markets can be grouped into one of the following categories: individual
investors; 2 62 institutional investors; 2 63 brokers, dealers and futures
256. Id.
257. See Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 246 (testimony of David
Ruder, Chairman, SEC). For a discussion of the role of margins in futures and
securities transactions, see supra notes 218-27 and accompanying text.
258. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 23, 77.
259. For a discussion of the similarities between futures and securities
transactions, see supra notes 248-58 and accompanying text.
260. For a discussion of the participants in the futures and securities mar-
kets, see infra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
261. For a discussion of intermarket trading participants, see infra notes
270-73 and accompanying text.
262. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., A
STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS 1-
15 (1985) [hereinafter FUTURES AND OPTIONS STUDY].
263. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 438 (testimony of Leo Me-
lamed, Chairman of CME). Institutional investors generally consist of mutual
funds, pension and endowment funds and other commercial enterprises. Id.
The commodity pool is the equivalent of a mutual fund, distinguished only by
the fact that the commodity pool invests solely in the commodity futures mar-
kets. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.59. For a discussion of the
role of institutional investors in the futures and securities markets, see supra
notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
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commission merchants; 26 4 brokerage houses;2 65 the exchanges and in-
dustry associations; 26 6 regulatory officials; 267 and businesses and com-
modity producers, theoretically, the ultimate beneficiaries of securities
and futures trading.26 8 The similar identities of market participants,
coupled with similar transactional forms, similar regulatory structures
and similar substantive laws, will facilitate the creation of a single regula-
tory agency with authority over both the securities and futures
industries.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the similar nature of the two mar-
kets is the incidence of investors trading in both markets. Many com-
mentators have concluded that the securities and securities index
related futures markets are, in fact, a single linked market. 2 69 Market
participants, using such trading strategies as portfolio insurance and in-
dex arbitrage, trade simultaneously in both markets, thereby strengthen-
ing the ties between the markets. 270 In addition to the forms of
intermarket trading, a 1985 government study indicated that most par-
ticipants in the futures markets had also invested in securities. 2 7 1 Mar-
ket participants who have traded in both markets, sometimes using the
markets interchangeably, have been subject to regulation by two in-
dependent federal agencies. 2 72 The similar identity of the market par-
ticipants would facilitate the consolidation of the SEC and CFTC into a
single regulatory agency, thereby ending such unnecessarily duplicative
regulation.
264. A broker is "any person engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities for the account of others." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988). A
dealer is "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
his own account." Id. § 78c(a)(5). A futures commission merchant is an individ-
ual or other entity "engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase
or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any
contract market." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
265. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 23, 63.
266. Id. at 39, 76. For a discussion of the similarity between the regulatory
structures involved, see infra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
267. For a discussion of the similarities between the regulation of the fu-
tures and securities industries, see infra notes 274-302 and accompanying text.
268. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 22, 64-67.
269. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at vi; Financial Market Hearings, supra
note 7, at 355 (testimony of Wendy Gramm, Chairperson, CFTC) ("futures mar-
kets are linked to the underlying cash [securities] markets").
270. Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 258-59 (testimony of David
Ruder, Chairman, SEC) ("[Tlhe primary use to stock index futures ... is to
execute transactions in which futures are used as a direct substitute for ...
stocks."). For a discussion of index arbitrage, see supra notes 170-74 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of portfolio insurance, see supra notes 164-69 and
accompanying text.
271. FUTURES AND OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 262, at 1-15.
272. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 8, at 55-57 (single market theory pro-
posed and analyzed).
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F. Similarity of Regulation
1. Introduction
The securities and futures industries are subject to similar forms of
regulation for two reasons. First, because the CFTC was patterned after
the SEC, it employs the same basic style of regulatory oversight as the
SEC.2 7 3 Second, the substantive offenses under futures law closely re-
semble the offenses under the federal securities laws, a fact which is di-
rectly attributable to the similarities between futures and securities
transactions. Therefore, the similar regulation of the two industries
would facilitate a consolidation of the CFTC and the SEC.
2. Regulatory Structure
Congress created the CFTC in 1974 after the SEC refused the invi-
tation to assume jurisdiction over the futures industry.2 74 Although the
SEC did not'accept the task, it served as the pattern for the newly-cre-
ated agency, the CFTC, which was granted regulatory jurisdiction over
the futures industry.2 75 The most important organizational similarity
between the agencies is their regulatory oversight structure. Both agen-
cies serve as the ultimate overseer of a system of industry self-regula-
tion.2 76 The most basic elements of this regulatory structure are the self
regulatory organizations (SROs), consisting of the exchanges and the
industry associations, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and
the National Futures Association. 27 7 The SROs conduct the day-to-day
regulation of their own operations, while the agencies oversee the
SROs' efforts, acting whenever the efforts fail either to ensure a fair and
orderly market or to protect the public interest. 278 Because both indus-
tries are subject to the same basic regulatory system, the creation of a
new federal agency, with authority over both industries, employing the
same system of agency oversight of industry self-regulation, would not
273. See Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 78 (CFTC modeled after
SEC); GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 70 (futures and securities industries
both operate under scheme of self-regulation with federal oversight). For a dis-
cussion of the similar regulatory systems governing the futures and securities
industries, see infra notes 279-84 and accompanying text.
274. Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 71.
275. Id. at 78.
276. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 70.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 39, 76. The SROs are responsible for, among other things, es-
tablishing rules for trading and membership qualifications, monitoring daily
trading activity, investigating potential rules violations and disciplining viola-
tors. Id. The agencies are responsible for, among other things, approving SRO
rules, establishing rules for the registration of firms and individuals involved in
trading, monitoring trading, investigating suspicious trading activity, inspecting
the SROs to ensure compliance with agency rules and compliance measures, and
investigating and enforcing the provisions of the governing statutes. Id. at 38-
51, 77-88.
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impose a hardship on either industry. Therefore, the similar regulation
of the futures and securities industries would facilitate a consolidation of
the CFTC and the SEC.
3. Substantive Law
The futures and securities industries are further subject to similar
regulation because the substantive laws governing the two industries are
alike. The substantive laws have developed similarly for two reasons.
First, the substantive laws reflect the fact that securities and futures
transactions are comparable in nature. 2 79 Second, judges often apply
securities law precedents to cases involving futures law when no corre-
sponding futures precedent exists. 28 0 The substantive laws governing
the futures and securities industries can be grouped into two categories:
those protecting the integrity of the market as a whole2 8 ' and those pro-
tecting market participants from abuses by other market participants. 28 2
The best example of a substantive provision directed at protecting
market integrity is the prohibition against price manipulation. Both the
Commodities Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act prohibit,
either implicitly or explicitly, manipulative conduct; but, neither statute
defines manipulation. 28 3 Courts interpreting both acts, however, have
held that the primary element of price manipulation is simply the intent
279. For a discussion of the similarities between futures and securities
transactions, see supra notes 248-58 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353 (1982) (finding an implied cause of action under Commodities Ex-
change Act); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D. Pa. 1984)
(allegation of "churning" stated cause of action under Rule lOb-5 of Securities
Exchange Act and § 4b of the Commodities Exchange Act); CFTC v. J.S. Love &
Assoc. Options, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("in all material
respects [§. 13a of the Commodities Exchange Act] is the same as that in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21 (e) .... Accordingly, case law developed
under the securities laws is pertinent to cases under § 13a-I of the [Commodi-
ties Exchange] Act, such as this one."). Although the CFTC has readily grasped
the substantive holding ofJ.S. Love, it has argued against the unfettered applica-
tion of securities laws precedents to futures cases. 3 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN,
supra note 18, § 5.39.
281. For a discussion of substantive laws designed to protect the integrity
of the market, see infra notes 283-296 and accompanying text.
282. For a discussion of substantive laws designed to protect market par-
ticipants from the abuses of other market participants, see infra notes 297-302
and accompanying text.
283. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b), 78o(c) (1988) (prohibition of manipulation in
securities transactions); 7 U.S.C. §§ 5, 7(d), 9, 13(b) (1988) (prohibition of ma-
nipulation in futures transactions). Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act
prohibits manipulative activity on national securities exchanges, § 10(b) prohib-
its manipulative activity in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and
§ 15(c) prohibits manipulative activity by broker-dealers and extends to the
over-the-counter market. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b), 78o(c) (1988).
Section 3 of the Commodities Exchange Act reflects a general congressional
recognition that futures markets are prone to manipulation, § 5(d) requires
boards of trade to have rules prohibiting manipulation, and §§ 6(b) and 6 (c)
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to manipulate the price of a security or futures contract. 284 In addition,
both acts prohibit similar types of conduct. The Commodities Exchange
Act prohibits transactions known as either a " 'wash sale', 'cross trade'
or 'accommodation trade' ",285 while the Securities Exchange Act pro-
hibits transactions "[f]or the purpose of creating a false or misleading
appearance of active trading."'28 6
Two other forms of prohibited trading impact on the integrity of
the market. The first form of trading, frontrunning, involves the placing
of orders based on nonpublic knowledge of an impending large block
trade. 2 87 Although neither statute specifically prohibits frontrunning,
both agencies assert that other provisions implicitly forbid the prac-
tice. 28 8 Intermarket frontrunning, trading in index futures based on in-
side knowledge of impending trades in the securities markets and vice-
versa, 28 9 has been the most vilified form of the practice290 and has been
the subject of negotiations between the New York Stock Exchange and
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 29 1
permit enforcement actions against manipulators. 7 U.S.C. §§ 5, 7(d), 9, 13b
(1988).
284. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) ("[M]anipulation
refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market ac-
tivity."); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) ("[M]anipulation
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities."); Cargill, Inc. v.
Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971) ("The aim [when looking for ma-
nipulative conduct] must be therefore to discover whether conduct has been in-
tentionally engaged in which has resulted in a [futures] price which does not
reflect basic forces of supply and demand."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
285. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(A) (1988). Wash sales are simultaneous purchases
and sales of securities or futures which are made not for profit potential but to
create the impression of trading volume. 3 P. JoHNsON & T. HAZEN, supra note
18, § 5.38. A cross trade in the futures industry occurs when a futures contract
merchant fills a customer's order by simply matching that order with another
customer's opposite order instead of offering the order to competitive bidding
in the pits. Id.
286. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (1988).
287. See SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 3-30; Schneider & Schapiro,
supra note 2, at 87.
288. SEC CRASH REPORT, supra note 67, at 3-30 to 3-31 (securities ex-
changes' rules indirectly prohibit frontrunning); CFTC CRASH REPORT, supra
note 186, at 198 & n.l 11, 199 (frontrunning indirectly prohibited by §§ 4b and
9b of the CEA; all exchanges selling index futures prohibit frontrunning).
289. CFTC CRASH REPORT, supra note 186, at 197.
290. See, e.g., Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 144-45 (statement of
Jeffrey Lane, President and Chief Operating Officer, Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.) (clearer standards on intermarket frontrunning needed).
291. See Financial Market Hearings, supra note 7, at 470 (testimony of John
Phelan, Chairman and CEO, NYSE). The New York Stock Exchange has since
promulgated a rule, which the SEC has approved, prohibiting intermarket front-
running. Market Reform Hearings, supra note 64, at 41 (testimony ofJohn Phelan,
Chairman and CEO, NYSE).
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The second form of trading, insider trading, is a variant of frontrun-
ning. Insider trading refers to the practice of trading on the basis of
material, nonpublic information while owing a fiduciary duty to some
entity involved in the transaction. 2 92 Although not specifically prohib-
ited by the Securities Exchange Act, insider trading is considered a vio-
lation of Rule lOb-5.293 Presently, however, insider trading does not
violate the Commodities Exchange Act.29 4 In fact, many futures indus-
try participants argue that insider trading plays a legitimate role in the
futures market. 29 5 Nevertheless, a recent bill introduced in the Senate
would make insider trading an express violation of the Commodities Ex-
change Act.2
96
The second category of substantive laws are those provisions in-
tended to protect market participants from abuses by other market par-
ticipants, particularly brokers and futures contract merchants. 29 7
Among the abuses proscribed by both the futures law and the federal
292. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225, 230 (1980) (insider has
duty to disclose nonpublic information or to refrain from trading).
293. Id. Once a substantive violation of Rule 10b-5 is established, the in-
sider may be subject to civil liability to contemporaneous traders under § 20A of
the Securities Exchange Act, civil penalties under § 21A of the Securities Ex-
change Act and criminal penalties under § 32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1, 78ff(1988). The civil liability sections were added to the Act by the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Id. § 78u-1.
294. Raisler & Morgen, Insider Trading Under the Commodities Exchange Act, in
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMODITY FUTURES REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
1989, at 126 (1989) (Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice
Course Handbook No. 667). The only parties subject to insider trading prohibi-
tions under the Commodities Exchange Act are employees of the CFTC. 7
U.S.C. § 13(d) (1988).
295. See Schneider & Schapiro, supra note 2, at 88. The futures industry
argues that trading on the basis of nonpublic information is legitimate because it
furthers the price discovery and hedging roles of futures. Id.
296. S. 1729, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The bill, known as the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1989, was tied to the CFTC reauthorization bill. Id.
The insider trading provisions of the bill are applicable only to exchange and
National Futures Association Officials, however. Id. Thus, the average futures
trader still would not be prohibited from trading on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation under this bill. Id. It is important to note that the House version of this
bill, known as the Commodity Futures Improvements Act of 1989, did not con-
tain an insider trading prohibition. H.R. 2869, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
The Futures Trading Practices Act and the CFTC reauthorization bill were held
up in Congress because of the ongoing jurisdictional dispute. Senators Fail in
Last Minute Effort to Resolve SEC-CFTCJurisdiction Dispute, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 41, 1476 (Oct. 19, 1990). For a discussion of the most recent dis-
putes and proposals, see supra notes 125-47 and accompanying text.
297. For a discussion of the various market participants, see supra notes
262-68 and accompanying text.
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securities laws are churning, 29 8 unauthorized trading,29 9 bucketing,3 00
and fraud.3 0 ' The similarity between such provisions stems from the
similarity between futures and securities transactions and similar market
participants.3 0 2 Thus, a single federal agency faced with similar transac-
tions, participants and substantive laws would have little difficulty in ef-
fectively asserting immediate regulatory authority over both the futures
and securities industries.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ever since the CFTC came into existence, it and the SEC have bat-
tled over the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions. Congress,
commentators and even the agencies themselves have proposed meas-
ures for resolving these conflicts, but to no avail. In the years since the
1987 market break, the agencies have expended considerable resources
defending their respective positions-the SEC aggressively demanding a
298. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.
1970) (churning violates Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act); Roche v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411, 1414-15 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (allegation of
churning states cause of action under § 4b of the Commodities Exchange Act
and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1976)
(churning as a "manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contri-
vance"). Churning refers to excessive trading in a discretionary account by a
broker or futures contract merchant. 3 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 18,
§ 5.45. The primary motivation behind such conduct is the generation of exces-
sive commissions. Id.
299. 17 C.F.R. § 166.2 (1991) (requiring either customer authorization of
futures trades or trading in an authorized discretionary account); see also Nye v.
Blyth Eastment & Dillon, Co., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978) (unauthorized trad-
ing violation of Rule lOb-5 of Securities Exchange Act); Silverman v. CFTC, 549
F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) (twenty-three unauthorized trades constituted violation
of § 4b of Commodities Exchange Act).
300. Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 670-73 (S.D.N.Y.)
(delaying execution of customer's order while broker sells own securities of
same class), aff'd per curiam, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966). Bucketing generally
refers to "any practice whereby an order is deprived of competitive execution in
the trading arena during normal trading hours." 3 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN,
supra note 18, § 5.37.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1951). In order to
state a claim of fraud under Rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with scienter, which is the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); see also 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
Courts interpreting § 4b of the Commodities Exchange Act have split on the
issue of the degree of scienter required to prove fraud. Compare McCurnin v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.
1973) (§ 4b requires willful conduct) with CFTC v.J.S. Love & Assocs. Options,
Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (willfullness not required under
§ 4b; applied securities definition of scienter). The CFTC staff argues strenu-
ously thatJ.S. Love represents the proper standard for scienter. 3 P. JoHNsoN &
T. HAZEN, supra note 18, § 5.39.
302. For a discussion of the similarity between futures and securities trans-
actions, see supra notes 248-58 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
similar market participants, see supra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
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merger of the agencies and the CFTC fighting for its very existence.
Since the Chicago Mercantile decision, the conflicts have escalated to a
point where the agencies have been described as "juvenile." One can
only wonder how much further the agencies are willing to carry their
fight. Such escalation, however, can only harm the exchanges, investors,
businesses and other entities that rely on the integrity of the futures and
securities markets. For these reasons, Congress must consolidate the
SEC and the CFTC into a single regulatory agency with authority over
both the securities and futures industries.
John D. Benson
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